

Title: Organizational analysis: the generative speech act model

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Organisational analysis: the generative speech act model

Organisations can be seen as functional institutions (Tuomela 2013), implying a goal- or task-oriented group of people trying in some way to change the world (from words/projects to world direction of fit (DF), Searle 2001), production, service delivery, control, exchange etc. Any new organization (and any change of existing organisations) implies a process of learning, verbal exchanges and willfulness in innovative thinking/suggesting new ways of acting. Implementation implies realism and power. Speech act theory has for a long time contributed to our understanding of movements of individuals into groups, or movements from individual to collective intentions and group acting (Tollefsen IEP). Searle/Smith have contributed to our understanding of status assignments, how they constitute abstract concepts (language) and how they, when agreed upon, create

social facts. The purpose of this paper is to merge speech acting constructively into the field of organizational analysis.

Any fact exists at different levels of abstraction. The modelling of organization done here assumes that the same organization can be studied at four levels of abstraction. (1) of locutionary acts; (2) of speech acting in the context of existing agreements/institutions; (3) speech acting as decision-making (Searle, Rationality in action) and (4) organizations acting in class-structured societies. The purpose of the paper is to give a condensed presentation of organizational processes at these four levels, and effects of interaction across those levels, suggesting that the four-leveled locutionary model is generic, applicable to the analysis of any organization and/or institution in societies where class divisions have a prominent role.

The model thus has a limited empirical applicability: to a type of modern nation state helix-divided (Leydesdorff 2000) societies. That is, specialized societies divided into three or four helix areas: politics, science/education, business and (perhaps) an independent and putative sphere of civil society and/or social movements. Societies with independent and specialized helix areas usually have some form of democracy. In this way there is a double modelling at work: a modelling of organization processes – locutionary acts at four levels – and a modelling of a specific type of modern statist society. The idea is that the relevance of the organization model is enhanced by developing it in a specified type of society. The model is developed here on Norwegian historical materials.

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I Introduction: speech acting in organizations

Speech acting has hardly been a concept in the multifarious field of organization theory. Most typically, organization theory has been a quest for understanding how a principal - organization owner - can arrange agents – employees - to serve goals and sub goals as effectively as possible.

How, if at all, was the driver or the motor of organization conceived in the field of organization studies? Taylor (1911) suggested early on that the organization leadership should develop and control tools, distribute them to workers according to tasks. The assumption was that workers were simple materialists: more pay, more work, more loyalty. Mayo (1949) suggested in the 1930's that treating workers as independent persons, allowing some autonomy to them, would increase both loyalty and productivity. That was how he read the Hawthorne experiments. In the 1950's USA Simon (1947) suggested that all employees could contribute to problem solving. The workers should be drawn into the organizing process. From these icons we see that the definition of the agent changed: from principal-

guided instruments to independent persons, to active participants, in their organized settings, in decision-making. The definition of the principal also changed over the same time span (1900-1960): from unitary owners in control of effective means for capital expansion to the principal as a coalition of stakeholders with owner interests managed by employed leaders. These changes in drivers of organization paralleled developments in the organization of politics in democratic states.

Nation states typically reduce or withdraw central political authority from society, or locate that authority in a special place in society, called the public sector. That left the rest of the state-bordered society, called the private sector, open to individual, personal and organizational autonomy. In some nation states that meant democracy: the citizenry really electing the principal and the citizen with inalienable human rights. The principal was often a law-making assembly, in control of government, with superordinate authority in society. However, in the economy and in specific organizations and firms in both private and public sectors in most kinds in nation states, the agents - the employees - are not given the right to participate in the election of the principals of the firm.

The problem here is how speech act theory can contribute insight into that asymmetry: citizens electing principals in political organizations but not in economic productive organizations. Koselleck (2002) has suggested how ideas of active organization arose in late medieval Europe. The idea emerged that society was not given by a Creator and managed on his will by the Church, but could be created autonomously by cooperative humans aided by systematic investigations of nature and society. Speech act theory tries to spell out how organization is created where no such organization existed in beforehand. In the broad field of organization theory there are suggested answers to that question. Coase (1937) proposed a theory of transaction costs where firms are created when controlled production of goods is cheaper than buying the goods in markets. North (1990) has suggested that organizations are created when communities are threatened from the outside, either economically and/or violently. Simon again has suggested that principals organize because organization “lifts the agents into the rational world”. In organizations people are assigned limited and specialized tasks. The owner/entrepreneur or principal draws people out of their basic laziness and activates their rationality by assigning them specific tasks within a principal managed organization. Hodgson (2013:64) suggests that “there are some neural, biological and evolutionary foundations for our dispositions to cooperate”. So in a sense organization is in our genes. All these theories suggest a hierarchy of drivers, where principals activate the

agents the employees, common people, workers etc. into organization. However, Coase's theory does not see employees at all, only principals, while Hodgson assigns quite a bit of organizing power to biology.

None of these theories, as I here briefly have described them, assign importance to the human capacity of language, of speech acting, except perhaps Hodgson (2013). He suggests that "moral claims rely on language" (p25), but quickly retreats to biology: "morality has evolved by natural selection of groups" (p25) and that "a moral disposition (is) near-universal" (p26). Hodgson says (on p75) that a fully developed moral capacity is impossible without language. I will here suggest how speech acting generates organization, how speech acting, based in the human capacity to use abstract language, is a "motor" of human cooperation and of stabilized and powerful human cooperation in organizations. First some presuppositions, some first principles on human capacities, then a brief ontology of organization and a somewhat more specified presentation of neo-classical, behavioral and institutional "motors" of organization, before a specification of the generative speech act model.¹

First principles

Humans, as all animals, are intentional beings, that is, they continuously intervene into the physical and social world they are in, trying to realize what they experience as needs and – for humans – interests. All their energies and capacities are intentional in this sense. All animals are social, in the sense of being cooperative and in practice at least, dependent upon others. Humans labor, that is they process nature with tools to realize their needs and interests. Labor can in a very concrete sense be solitary and done without speech acting. Not verbalized experience or tacit knowledge can be enough to allow or stimulate work at the individual level. But very early on speech-act generated cooperation increased effectiveness. Humans developed abstract language or the ability to talk about things that need not be tangibly present or ideas without any materiality at all. Abstract language gave humans the competence of rationality, defined by Searle (2001) as the ability and even the need to act on reasons. But as animals, also humans can act violently. As individual labor on the one hand violence on the other can unfold without or beyond speech acting. Speech-acting theory thus

¹ John Searle has over a long time and in many publications, step by step developed a model of speech-acting. It is an empirical model. It is developed on registered experiences. His material is special. He takes the human being as a modern species as the source of his data. He assumes, correctly, that biologically we are all the same. For that reason what is correct in his model has universal relevance. Here I am trying to move his model into more culturally specific materials, in effect into the study of organizations. Organizations are not biology. Organizations are social facts and therefore they spring from culturally specific contexts. Since I want to model real activities, real experiences, I limit my modelling ambition to organizations in modern, reasonably democratic nation-state settings.

has a domain limited toward these two fields, physical labor and physical violence. These five competences, intentionality, sociality, physical labor, physical violence and rationality, are first principles behind what follows, five human capacities, developed over a long evolution and built into the biology of the human body.

The ontology of organization

Labor is necessary for human physical survival. Labor without or with very primitive tools can be coordinated, in the same way that for example lions coordinate their hunt of other animals for feed. That is an experience-based coordination with some signaling in the flock, but without use of abstract language. The huge step to planned and coordinated labor assumes the presence of an abstract language. Planned labor is a product of speech acting, that is using language elements (sentences) to convey an intention (a plan) to others – that then need to interpret and understand the chosen combination of language elements used by the initiating person. Through speech acting back and forth those speaking can agree on a plan. If they agree that plan can be used to specify the actions of each and all the participants in the labor or production process. Because of the language capacity it is also possible to get together after the production process is completed to discuss and evaluate the process, to learn of strengths and weaknesses, as a preparation for a new go. A successful planning process creates a collective intention, that is, all the participants come to agree on a superordinate intention, with a number of subordinate, more specific intentions for some and each of the participants. They agree on a project. The project can be seen as a set of rules, of agreements on what should be done by whom at what time. Such a set of rules for collective action can be seen as an institution, especially if the rules prove efficient and are seen as sensible by many. If the rules apply to a project into the future and imply coordinated action, we speak of a functional institution, or an organization.

This ontology of organization has a triple base: labor in nature, speech acting among people and violence. Labor in nature produces necessities and generates practical learning. Labor teaches humans how nature works in relation to human survival needs. That learning is from practice to experiential knowledge. Speech acting lifts cooperation from social spontaneous interaction to institutional planned interaction. The abstract language capacity makes planned, reasoned cooperation possible and opens up for building all kinds of institutions, theater, shops, families, garden parties, mafia groups, markets, municipalities, states, corporations etc. Without abstract language and speech acting, no institutions, no organizations. Two humans with about the same abstract language, speech acting toward agreements, creating collective

intentions, having the will to implement, is the basic motor of organization. Violence is the third base. When speech-acting fails, when the will to agree is not there, physical violence is an alternative to implement a project that includes the opponents of the project. Such violence is by definition beyond speech-acting. A strong theory is that nation-states are constituted on physical violence. They exist when an organization of soldiers controls a territory in a way that is respected by other states (Weber 1864-1920, Tilly 1929-2008).

II The motors of organization in neoclassical, behavioral and institutional organization theory

How have the motors of organization been defined in these three fields of organization theory? How are those ontologies of organization in line with or in contradiction to the speech act ontology of organization?

A. Neo-classical economic theory

As this theory hardly says anything about the organization of the firm, it can hardly be called or said to contain an organization theory, a theory of the firm (Knudsen 1991:282). Neo-classical theory looks at the firm as a production unit, which transforms natural resources to products sold in markets. Some simple assumptions are: 1) that firm leadership has full knowledge of the market situation, supply and demand there and all prices; and 2) that individuals are subjective, personal utility maximizers, measured in terms of prices set of both incoming and outgoing commodities. Neo-classical economic theory models how demand and supply processes reach a balance in different kinds of markets – from free markets with many small firms, via oligopolies to markets with one monopoly, the processes seen either from markets or from firm perspectives (Knudsen 1991:282). Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen developed the theory of the firm as a production unit in both a closed and open economy, analyzing the basic relations in a circulation system, allowing for analysis of the conditions for balanced exchange in each of the nodes in the system (Frisch 1964). In neo-classical economic theory, then, there hardly is an identification of a motor, some kind of subset of actors that wield generative, organizing power in the system. Many firms in several encompassing markets are seen as a kind of natural system, with each firm having microscopic autonomy that generates variations in actions towards or away from a balance, or to a situation where supply and demand exactly fit to continuously empty the market.

B. Behavioral organization theory

As companies grew in size and shareholding became a regular format of ownership, there developed a new role for firm management. The management's interpretation of the firm, its structure of goals, its strategies in markets and its organization became an important variable, modifying and reducing the explicit and putative role of owners. The firm attained varying forms of organization because of varying competencies and power of managements. The firm's employed leadership became an important motor in the firm, both internally and in its relation to actors in and beyond markets. This lead was picked up by Simon in his studies of goal- setting in firms. How did leadership actually function in setting goals/sub-goals and in organizing the firm? In his classic article on goals (Simon 1964) he suggests that the inducement-contribution balance is the motor of participation in an organization. He suggested that goal analysis should be evaluating motives up against constraints, motives being the personal factor, constraints being the organizational factor.² Organizations (or for Simon and his colleagues American middle sized firms) should be considered as loosely coupled systems, which gave some autonomy and discretionary power to the many units inside the firm and makes it necessary most often to search for reasonable not optimal solutions to problems and tasks. Because this is the typical structure, decisions that are satisfactory on some established criteria are chosen. The idea of maximization is seldom operational. Simon did not ask how new organizations are established. He looked at really existing firms and asked how they were managed. He suggests that the motor of organizing is not the leadership alone. Because of the loose coupling there are many smaller motors. Where they are located varies and can partly be answered by looking at the firm's market situation. The type of urgent problem will often determine the relative power of different sections/units of the organization, those sections with most knowledge and power into the urgent problem will easily become a power center in the organization. The inducement-contribution balance is clearly a problem of social psychology. Simon has no attention directed at speech acting, at what goes on when people meet and talk about the situation and/or what to do, or talk together as decisions are being implemented, as the work is being done, or what happens when institutions speak through their statements/documents, through their leaders.

² Fredrik Barth (1966) defines organization as "an aggregate of people exercising choice". Peoples' transactions in such an aggregate are "influenced by certain constraints and incentives". Because of the stable constraints and incentives choices produce "statistical regularities".

III The generative speech act model of organization

The generation of social facts

The idea of a generative model is taken from the anthropologists Barth(1966) and Brox (1989 and 1995). A generative model does not primarily model an existing system. It models the emergence of social facts. It models the processes that produce specific social facts. Brox for example asks what produces the stability of hierarchical coastal fisheries communities in northern Norway. He suggests that stability is the consequence of interactions with larger external communities. At the lowest status level of the fishing community new fishermen are recruited from families, from youngsters trained in active fishing boats and some (few) from the educational system. At the top of the status-hierarchy the most successful fishermen make profits. They generate a section of rich people in the community that take on new economic investment interests, in industry and trade. They threaten reproductive stability. But in stable communities these people often exit with their capital to other urban centers. The result is stable and dynamic coastal fisheries communities with a social hierarchy that is functional for continued fisheries and related activities.

A model premise is that the emergence of one and the same empirical reality can be modelled at different levels of abstraction. An example in the physical world is the light switch, (1) on and off, (2) the line circuit, (3) the movement of energy in the circuit, (4) the movement of molecules, (5) the atomic processes. In the social world, for example a small scale farm in Norway, (1) the family works the farm, transforming natural and animal resources to food that can be sold in markets. Labor is learned and developed through experience. Members of the family are continuously speaking to each other, in different contexts;(2) the socio-economic and cultural processes on the farm based in historically developed institutions; (3) At a third level they are engaged in decision-making, in management, determining new aspects of both internal and external organization of the farm.; (4) At a fourth level, the farm is under public administration, local/national/international and influenced by class relations. Ideally we would want to model processes at all these levels, how they contribute to the generation of a time-specific organization of the farm.

The speech act model

The basic element in a speech act is a locution, an utterance with a meaning. We make a noise, a blast of modulated sound towards another person. The blast has a commonly known

meaning. The specific modulated sound has been assigned a status. It refers to something in physical, psychic or social reality. Most concepts in a language have a long history, but new concepts, related to new social, psychic and physical facts can come into a language quickly, and concepts disappear when their references disappear.

Before we speak we most often have an intention to speak. Then the question is what to say. For example, I want to give the person some guidance as to rearing of her child. A third step is then to choose the locutions that together will give her a relevant and for her acceptable guidance. A fourth step - that can come earlier or later in the process - is to determine the mode of the message: quietly, a friendly mode, harshly, with anger and force etc. As Searle suggests, a proposition is always presented in a certain psychological mode. So a proposition p is presented in a mode F , or a full proposition is an F function of p , or $F(p)$.³ The specific p put forward is an illocution, a willed proposition with the intention of communicating to the other person a statement, hoping it will have the effect intended. The statement activates a locutionary process in the other person. It is heard, interpreted and evaluated, as interesting, irrelevant, quite so impolite or otherwise. The active reception is called a perlocution. The perlocution will most often stimulate an illocutionary act back to the first speaker, and so the exchange will move back and forth, hopefully to some agreement or at least understanding.

The idea that speaking is acting is that speaking can affect or even create new social relations. If the guidance on child rearing is seen as an insult, the p through its perlocution can change a close relation between two to a conflictual relation. That effect can or cannot have been intended by the first speaker. We can say that the organization between the two is changed by p . But an exchange can generate new social facts. Two talk about going to the movies and they agree to do so, tomorrow. That is a new social fact. The two have produced and accepted a common intention, a collective intention. They both intend the same, to go to the movies together. This is the basic speech act model of organization: through speaking the two come to an agreement to act together in a coordinated way. The agreement implies a number of logistical decisions: which movie, where, when, who shall pay, shall we go out together after

³ Marcel Proust (1985) suggests some insights into the F in $F(p)$. The sound of speech is influenced by the thought being expressed, the tone, the diphthongs and labials. Speech expresses meaning less precisely and deeply than writing – listening to Bergotte speaking did not give associations to his wonderful writing. (P163). Reason: successful writing draws insights from the depths of the heart, a product of sustained intellectual labor. Beautiful writing cannot be predicted, just like the beauty of a woman still unknown. The power of writing and speaking is often in the details, in the disclosure of the specific. Clear ideas are often those that are as unclear as those already in the listener. New ideas are boring/irritating because they don't fit into the idea-world of the listener.

the movie etc. And the agreements have to be implemented, implying new decision-making, which can reinforce or weaken motivations to go through with the project.

When speaking we experience a freedom, continuously open, somewhat insecure moments of choice: what to say next and how to say it, or perhaps to exit, to stop speaking. Speech act analysis is naturally interested in what goes on in those open moments. In some way a speech intervention is an outcome of processes and reflections in those open moments. Those moments are constituted by our capacity for language. Concepts force time, space and reflection on us. In those moments we evaluate both what the situation is, we search for possible interventions and evaluate which of alternative interventions to choose, to actually say. We reason. This reasoning and reasoned action/intervention that follows can be seen as the core of human rationality (Searle 2001).

The basic speech act model of organization is that all new organization is a product of speech acting exchanges that reach agreements on future projects. That micro process is ubiquitous. Reached agreements can be copied and gain increasing legitimacy and thus reach an empirical mass/level that becomes an acknowledged institution, a set of rules that constitutes, liberates and regulates activity. The micro process always contains the unregulated time-spaces between specific decisions or interventions – called gaps (Searle 2001). The gap suggests that the locutionary process implies an element of innovation. Because the gap is unregulated the outcome is in principle always an innovation, in the sense that the outcome cannot fully be deduced from existing knowledge, rules and/or obligations. Lastly the model specifies the idea and subjective experience of free will.

GSM modifies the transaction model

How does the model add to or modify the Simon/Barthian transaction model of the constraints/incentive dynamics? Constraints and incentives are obviously external objects to be interpreted by the actor, the person in focus. The generative speech act model suggests how that interpretation and other materials are processed by persons speaking to each other. For Barth the constraints-incentives dynamic through many cases generates a statistical pattern = the social = in sum society. The GSM suggests that there is an element of freedom in the gap, making explanations of idiosyncratic interventions just as possible as interventions in line with routines, with what is common. While the transaction model suggests that institutions are a product of statistical selection governed by constraints/contribution balances, the GSM suggests institutions are products of freely produced and iterated agreements. While the

transaction model gives priorities to structures,⁴ GSM gives priority to subjectivity and the creation of collective intentions through speech acting.

Barth seeks an understanding of the process from the constraints/incentive balance to patterns of behavior. It is a transformation from structure to behavior. The parties to the transformation mobilize that status which is considered most appropriate and powerful in the interaction. Over time statuses are modified/strengthened as response to the other party's status presentation. "...for each party's behavior is modified by the presence and behavior of the other in a progressional sequence."(p4). Seen from GSM it is surprising that the anthropologist Barth does not see that most exchanges actually occur through speaking and/or writing. Institutions, rules, constraints and inducements and status management are all present in some format in exchanges, but the process is most often organized and implemented through language/speech/writing.⁵ Speaking/writing to another person is intentional activity, using language specific sounds carrying meaning and implying rationality, which is using some time to search for reasonable interventions in unregulated time-gaps where materials are processed on their potential value in the exchange, without having rules determine which materials, which values, knowledge, obligations etc. to actually use. GSM thus adds or creates a new space in Barth's transaction model where rational people unfold a speaking/writing activity, which potentially deepens insights into the emergence of new social facts in institutionalized settings.

IV GSM in the context of institutions

A premise for GSM is that there are two types of speaking, speaking/writing in a cognitive, knowledge seeking process and speaking/writing in a project context, in the context of "what to do next", finding and agreeing (or disagreeing) on projects into the future. Knowledge is a question of how the world is, projects are questions of what we want to or perhaps should do some time into the future.. Implemented projects mean changing the world, creating something physical or social that did not exist earlier. A knowledge norm is truthfulness. Projects are not evaluated on truthfulness – rather on their willfulness (volition), their realism and/or moral quality. Searle speaks of the direction of fit (DF) between statements and reality.

⁴ Barth's definition of institutionalization: how a multiplicity of individual decisions under the influence of canalizing factors can have the cumulative effect of producing clear patterns and conventions. P3

⁵ Barry Smith (2014) suggests that the writing or production of documents and their function in varying institutions adds a new ontological dimension to Searle's speech act theory (of 1995 and 2010). While for Searle institutional social facts are products of trusted agreements, Smith suggests that the materiality/physicality of documents has an independent effect on the formation of social facts.

DF is opposite for the two types of activity/speaking/writing: DF knowledge (cognition) - from world to statement, the statement is made to represent the found reality; DF projects (volition) - from statements (on projects) to (a new) world, or, changing the world according to the project. The cognitive and volitional are related. Knowledge is most often a premise for projects and a knowledge project - a research project – (willfulness) is most often a premise for actually finding/formulating new knowledge. The distinction explicates the relation between normativity and objectivity: projects are normative, the knowledge ideal is (and should be) objectivity. The distinction speaks to the ontology of facts: social facts have a subjective and normative constitution. Social facts are agreements about relations and activities that we want – someone wants, brute facts have an objective ontology. The biological physical processes that over and over again create the human brain - as most deep processes in physical nature - exist independently of human activity, norms and wants.

In this way GSM is already situated in three major human institutions: - in language and specifically in multifarious languages across the globe; - in the human search and development of knowledge, in earliest times first probably separated out from productive activity in schools; - and in the huge institutions of project making or politics, where humans actively organize the societies they live in and struggle to defend them against attacks/invasions from other societies, in earliest times probably the active organization of families. So, existing institutions are always a major reference for GSM. The question is, at this second level of abstraction, how speech acting is related to institutions.

A common assumption in social science is that institutions constrain us. A strong assumption in some neo-institutional theorizing (e.g. March and Olsen 1995) is that institutions nearly determine who we are, how we see the world and how we act. GSM at the locutionary level suggests that people, after rational reflection, enter into those collective intentions that further – and optimize - their values and interests. The created organization is most likely seen to enhance the power of attaining, reaching, realizing the agreed upon goals. That many (perhaps most) people enter institutions without such a rational reflection over what the institution is about, does not change this suggested basic mechanism. Formal institutions empower their creators and members. Formal institutions are themselves constrained by their social (elite/class) generators and other institutions making demands in their operative field (Tuomela 2013), for example public schools are constrained/confronted by private schools. Formal institutions can (often) contain internal opposition, transforming cooperative speech acting to conflictual struggle, making for internal divisions, use of power, oppression etc.

New formal institutions can emerge in direct competition/conflict with existing institutions, for example a Labor Party emerges in Norway in the 1890s in direct competition for worker members with the established Left Liberal Party. The point is that the micro-locutionary process, with its verbal exchanges, status assignments, rational reflections and agreements is at work in every aspect of these macro-organizational processes and is both advanced and modified by existing institutions.

How do institutions impinge on the locutionary process? How can that impingement be modelled? An assumption is that agreements generate obligations. Agreements can be seen as rules or tasks. Rules regulate. Tasks can also be seen as rule sets, but within a project, which sets the standard for success. The right hand driving rule has no task. It regulates behavior. How a person gets into a task-institution, an organization, affects the obligation. If you are forced in obligations may be close to nil. In their ability to generate obligations and responsibilities institutions have deontic power. Because rules have popular legitimacy, once inside the institutional territory you experience an obligation to follow the rules. Norbert Elias⁶ (1969, 1982, 2000) called this form of power internalized power. The guiding/controlling power is inside your head, as an experienced obligation. All people are in this sense members of a multitude of institutions. Acting on a simple personal physical pleasure principle beyond or on the outside of all institutions is impossible (Hodgson 2013). GSM assumes that all exchanges touch or activate institutionally generated obligations. When reflecting rationally on what to do, in the unregulated time-space gaps, physical needs and knowledge is drawn into the field of reflection. But a necessary reference is the set of experienced/seen obligations. Institutions impinge on the locutionary process through the experienced obligations. The illocutionary choice of which obligation to honor in the following intervention is always to some extent a free choice. The Kantian idea that there has to be a rule to make a chosen action rational (Searle 2001: 153), or the neo-institutional suggestion that institutions guide actions without persons reflecting freely on the rules, on the demands, is contrary to the GSM understanding of how institutions impinge on the locutionary process.

GSM suggests that institutions enter an exchange through the experienced obligations they create in persons. The obligations are processed in the unregulated time-spaces of reflection. Knowledge and desires also enter or are drawn into that space, but if rules, knowledge or desires directly determine what we do, we are not in the mode of rationality. We are then

⁶ The Social Constraint moves towards Self-Constraint, in Elias the Civilizing Process (1969, 1982, 2000).

robots. No person is such a robot. Therefore GSM creates a space for persons acting on obligations, or acting on desire-independent reasons (Searle 2001), between existing institutions/rules on one side and actual action/interventions on the other side, with knowledge and desires present/activated as materials in the exchange.

V GSM in organization

If the locutionary process is a first level of reality, the locutionary process in its institutional setting a second level, the GSM as decision-making in organization is a third level. That level assumes that an organization has been created, with a set of people more or less connected into a project, with some hierarchy in the sense of at least a leadership and members/employees, active in a complex of agreements/coordinated rules with some kind of boundary to other organizations and to society. The question is perhaps the most common in the field of organization studies: how are decisions made; how are decisions and actual interventions into the world related; how do interventions/implementation of decisions/projects feed back into the organization in the form of learning?

The GSM of decision-making in organization assumes that the locutionary process is at work in all parts of the organization where two or more members are engaged in tasks, and relevant when considering the organization as actor (Tuomela 2013, Tollefsen 2002). Decision-making at both levels is intentional, it moves continuously between research, search for relevant knowledge and project-making, trying to specify goals/sub-goals and methods – organization - for reaching them. It moves from decisions/actual interventions to new decisions/interventions with GAPS, time-spaces for reflection in between. It is in the GAPS that rationality, the search for pressing/reasonable actions, unfolds. If true, the idea of unregulated GAPS opens a new field of organization research, the processes of deliberation, investigation and status assignment struggles that take place in the time-space between decisions/actual interventions. GSM suggests that the qualities of the organization, the relative power of different types of knowledge and the power struggles in the organization over projects and varying obligations, with winners and losers, will emerge much clearer with investigations reflections and speech-acting in the GAPS. When the paradigmatic focus is on comparative studies of decisions and their implementation, the research discourse is evaluative: to what degree do chosen operations realize the determined goals; are the decisions logical deductions from the intentions, given the situation? The GAPS are by definition decision-free/rule-free time-spaces made when considering voluntary actions.

Search, reflection over past practice, new suggestions, deliberation on projects among a varying set of people are (some of) the themes in the made time-space of the GAPS.


Can groups (organizations) be considered conscious agents or actors? Tuomela 2013 and Tollefsen 2002 answer a conditioned yes. Tuomela suggests that when people act in a “we-mode” – like: we want to and will paint the house – it is analytically fruitful to consider the “we-group” as an intentional actor, despite the fact that only persons have intentions and can express them. Tuomela’s position is that despite the latter fact, persons in we-modes act “from their group’s point of view” (p.x). They act on a group reason, the group identification is primary (“we are all in the same boat” px) and each person is committed to the defined joint intention. Tuomela considers the idea of groups as agents to be especially important in the study of large, complex organizations: “for it gives practical understanding and explanation of such group’s activities” (p90). Tuomela thus agrees with Searle that only persons have explicit intentions. Collective intentions are created through speech-acting and agreeing on projects. The agreement is or becomes a collective intention and the process creates a group, potentially an institution (common rules) or even an organization – a functional institution. Searle 2001: “collective intentionality enables groups of people to create common institutional facts, such as those involving money, property, marriage, government and above all language.” The process has the form: x counts as y in context c. Sounds are given status, given meaning. Persons are assigned abstract status: Erna Solberg is – at present 2014 – prime minister in Norway. Physical objects are assigned abstract status: that pile of rock is the mountain Ulriken, that building on Karl Johan Street is the Storting, the Norwegian parliament building. Because collective intentions generate obligations, the speech act process of institutionalization creates desire-independent reasons for acting. The reason for paying for the beer in the restaurant is desire-independent, or if a beer drinker feels a desire to pay, it is the obligation that generates the desire. All status functions have necessary material conditions. To become a teacher a certain set of experiences, education, age etc. have to be in place. For a priest to marry two people the priest must have the authority to marry, which again depends on some set of experiences, certain assignments/approvals given within the priest’s church etc. For something to be termed a screwdriver the thing must have some physical capacities. Humans can try to create collective intentionality on any fantasy, but only some of those attempts have the necessary material (non-intentional) conditions to make it real. So, do groups have consciousness? No. But, is it fruitful to consider groups as actors? Yes. When groups are made of members with strong we-identity, identity consistent with the

identity of all (most) of the members, the group can be seen as an actor, making decisions, organizing, intervening, learning etc.

From this it is reasonable to distinguish between formal and informal decision-making, informal being when groups get together within the organization without being assigned a task. We can distinguish between (1) organizational and extra-organizational and (2) oppositional decision making within an organization. Extra-organizational would be a member making decisions with a group or organization outside the member's own organization, for example an employee of Statoil making decisions within an unconnected food company. An example of oppositional decision-making could be when a member of organization A without being assigned the task, joins with other members of A or external people, to reform, weaken or even eliminate A. How then is the GSM model of decision-making in organizations?

Human action is intentional. So it is also in organizations. Depending on training and experience background competence varies (Searle 1995). Given high competence, the process of organizing interventions can be short and quick because it is in your or in the group's "body" how to act. The GSM-organization suggests that a first step in decision-making is the process of clarifying/deciding that a decision is needed. When that is determined and the group or the network of decision-makers has been selected, the next step is to clarify and agree upon what is the problem and the problem situation in the organization/network. A first GAP (A) is created, with complex activities geared at analyzing the situation (knowledge) and clarifying possible problem-solutions or projects/interventions (projects) that should reduce or solve the problem. Given an agreed upon solution, the third step is organizing the intervention, organizing the project or the implementation of it. A second GAP (B) is created, this time oriented at making a new specific organization for implementation. With that task reasonably fulfilled a fourth step is to actually start, keep up and complete the implementation, that is solving problems as they arise, keep/secure continued motivation and learning going in the implementing units etc. That may well be an extended period, especially when large tasks run by large complex organizations are to be implemented.

Figure: GSM – organization. Task- and problem-solving takes time



The basic GSM-organization model is speech-acting as an open process, now and then creating agreements, which gradually emerge into institutions – systems of rules – and functional institutions – task-oriented organizations, with locutionary speech-acting being ubiquitous in all contexts and phases of the organizing process, except where individual labor or violent actions take place.

March and Simon’s decision-making model, which has had wide acceptance in western organization theory over a long spell, has in the inducements-contributions balance a social-psychological base. The four elements of decision-making in firms, exposed in Cyert and March 1963/2001 are (1) quasi-resolution of conflict, through local unit autonomy, avoiding meetings between units with conflicting goals and/or conflicting methods (called local rationality), allowing for different success criteria between units (called acceptable level decision rules) and allowing units to solve one problem at the time, reducing the need to attend to interactions and dependencies (called sequential attention to goals). (2) avoid uncertainty, rather than tackling uncertainty, by reducing demands for predictions and allowing for specific contracts internally and to external suppliers and customers. Companies

solve problems when they arise, without the ambition of finding general methods/interventions that will hinder problems. (3) Search is activated when putative problems/tasks are on the table. Effective search is therefore motivated (by an experienced problem), simple-minded and biased (p.169). (4) Organizational learning is simple, in the sense that learning is seldom set as a major and coordinated activity in the organization. Learning according to Cyert and March is primarily adaptation, which is minor adjustments to modes of work that have functioned poorly. They find three forms of adaptation typical for the investigated (American) firms: - adaptation of goals, attention to problems and problem-driven search.

In Cyert and March's model of decision-making there is only one variable (of eleven) that touches on speech-acting: that is the demand: "negotiate with the environment" (p.175). The Cyert and March model is a management model in the sense of capturing how management (in mid-size American firms) typically organizes to keep firms alive and profitable. The GSM model puts focus on speech-acting as a motor in organizing and distinguishes between knowledge production and project development. Cyert and March imply that efficiency will keep people contributing. GSM implies that values/obligations taken care of create trust and system legitimacy selectively. Putative values contradicted can necessitate use of power to force continued contributions. However, people contradicted can choose exit (Hirschman 1970), into new, potentially value-respecting organizational units or in external organizations. The Hirschman strategies of loyalty, voice and exit will continuously be evaluated. When either of these strategies is met with disrespect, force is a management alternative for trying to secure continued contributions.

The GSM decision-making in organization model can be specified on types of speech acts and on obligations and responsibilities. Searle 1979 suggests that all speech acts can be placed in at least one of five categories: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. The categories open for more specific/critical analysis of speech-acting, be it verbal or in written/document format (Smith 2014). Assertives are typical knowledge statements; directives, different kinds of orders; commissives, promises and commitments; expressives describing attitudes; and declarations, changing the world and creating social facts in a statement ("you are hereby fired") (Searle 2010). Analysis of complex speech-acts, like long exchanges among many, or large complex documents using the five categories can disclose – the character of the exchange/the document; - the knowledge mobilized; - the type of intervention intended: education, honoring, commitments, organizing, commanding etc.

Knut Dahl Jacobsen suggested already in 1964 in a study of the public administration of agriculture in Norway (Jacobsen 1964), a model of speech-act structures in administrative decision-making. A speech-act structure is the organization invoked by a speech-act. The model contained eight variables:

1. The distribution of initiative
2. The distribution of relevant information
3. The directions of net influence between the parties in the exchange
4. The types and distributions of commitments
5. The decision outreach, its expanse of acceptance
6. The distribution of decision-making legitimacy
7. The outreach of its actual real effects
8. The distribution of responsibility for the speech-act, the decision and its effects.

Add to the model a specification of the organized actor, from networks with loosely coupled members primarily with I-identities to tightly integrated organizations with strict borders and strong we-identities (Tuomela 2013), the GSM – organization is a powerful tool for incisive and encompassing analysis of speech-acting in organizations, decision-making, implementation of projects and learning.

Organizations engage routinely in many types of problem solving, related to the different functions that need attention. In some network type organizations clients are close to being members and the units of the network are so loosely coupled that modes of operation are continuously adjusted to real time organization-client relations. Change of modes adjusted to changing situation and task definitions is then part of routine operation. However, when networks reach that type of active integration at the local level, the network as a collective can dissolve into the environment. In more hierarchic, integrated organizations that have a reasonably clear boundary to the environment, routines can also come up for evaluation, when for example dissonance organization – clients reaches a certain level, or as socio-psychological management theory puts it, when the distance between ambition and achievement reaches a certain level. Then the organization can be evaluated as a whole, as a group, as a community, and the mode of operation can become an explicit problem. Routines

can be supplemented with tasks like “review routines”, which can lead to the establishment of investigative teams, which can produce new knowledge, which can stimulate planning and in some cases to innovations, to implementing new technology, both technical and organizational. In networks, these modes may more easily change, but the shifts locally are as interesting to investigate in networks as in the more hierarchic organizations.

VI Modes of operation

Speech-acting is making propositions in a specific psychological mode (F(p)). This insight can be used in the analysis of organized decision-making. Organized collective decision-making unfolds in a mode, for example of research, knowledge finding, of friendliness, of sadness, of applause to specific people, of policy-making, power-wielding, of evaluation, of planning etc. The mode assigns a format of behavior that penetrates or conditions everything that is said and done in the collective (the meeting). Certain interventions in the group-meeting or happenings outside can change the mode. The mode is an important macro-variable in the study of speech-acting. The mode has effects on each person’s participation. The mode affects/sets limits on the types of interventions that are legitimate. Both the processes establishing modes and how and why modes change are questions within the GSM-organization.

GSM at both the locutionary and organizational levels suggests that mode changes are related to members’ obligations and responsibilities, obligations in the form of promised actions, responsibilities as chosen or assigned care – for a function, for a group, for a specific result etc. Obligations tend to tie people to certain activities, making mode changes rather threatening, while responsibilities can open for mode changes, given the responsibility, for example for a group is relatively wide or general. Limited responsibilities will easily lead to a more limited outlook. GSM would suggest that a combination of specific tasks and general responsibility together will most likely secure both effective organization and ability to move between modes of operation when needed.

There is a mode change that Searle has offered limited attention (Gran 2012); the change from deontic to more physical power wielding, we might call it the change from internalized to external power in organizations. Deontic power is assigned power, assignments that have been agreed upon. The agreement creates obligations and obligations generate a feeling of responsibility for acting in a certain way. “But the powers that are constitutive of institutional facts are always matters of rights, duties obligations, commitments, authorizations,

requirements, permissions and privileges.” (Searle 2004:93). Physical power is forcing action, by definition without an agreement with the person(s) forced, like not letting a person into a room, hitting a person to stop a certain action, shooting people, bombing peoples’ houses etc. (as in the Gaza strip at present mid-july 2014). The change from deontic to physical power, from intervening legitimately to using force is of major importance in studying organizations. Force will often be evoked when negotiations for an agreement between people in organizations or between organizations break down, or when people seen as opposition start forcing themselves into the organization. Boundaries are often indicators of where force can be used if the borders are transgressed illegitimately. Force can perhaps best be understood at the level of values or deep cultures. Boundaries often indicate the distinction between accepted and illegitimate values, between “us” and “them”. It is when people outside the boundary in some way don’t accept the lack of an agreement and start using what is seen as force by the other party to transgress the boundary into the “valued territory”. The use of force indicates value differences that for the time being hinder negotiations. The use of force indicates deep cultural divides. The user of force on both sides may have an assignment “from home” to use such power, like the police or soldiers in two conflicting nation states. The user may in this sense have deontic power. But using physical force cannot be seen as an assignment from the attacked party. Physical force is then a policy instrument. Unlawful use of force has the same dual character, deontic among the criminal’s supporters, physical and illegitimate as seen by the existing law-giving authorities. Physical force tells that speech-acting has broken down. Physical force against people reduces those people to things. How the physical mode is transformed to deonticity, to negotiations, speech acting on status assignments and new cooperative agreements has been investigated in political science, less in the field of organization studies.⁷

VII The GSM in modern, reasonably democratic nation state-/class divided societies

How can speech acting, the GSM and discourse dynamics give insight into the emergence and formation/organization of nation states? How does GSM help us understand public organizations in nation-states?

GSM modelling of nation state structures or typically public organizations in reasonably democratic modern nation states is a fourth level of model abstraction. As earlier, the task is

⁷ Tilly 1975 has for example suggested that it is when parties to conflicts become about equally physically powerful, that deonticity becomes possible.

to develop the GSM, this time with materials on nation-states and their relations. Reasonably democratic nation states are minimally those where most adult citizens routinely elect their rulers. Because nation states generally distinguish rulers from citizens and the public from the private sector, class is a relevant macro-concept. A political class can have its own interests relative to all citizens and to capital-owning and wage-labor classes. Ideally it is possible to imagine a nation state without class and in consequence: a distributed democratic state apparatus with elected administrators of varying status in different task/area-domains (Thompson 2003, 1967) and business firms/organizations with citizen/members and without wage labor (Ellerman 1995).

Historically nation states are hardly products of agreements following friendly deliberations between representatives of nations about distribution of territory. In general, nation states emerge from war (Tilly 1975, Rokkan 1975), when representatives of a nation can muster enough military power to defend a favored territory from violent incursions from other nation states. The GSM is relevant for describing the intra-national agreements on military organization and strategy, but not for describing the war process as such. Warring is by definition using physical power against another people, against that people's soldier and that people's physical installations. When attacking, the attacked people are not spoken to. GSM is interesting up to the point when an actor moves into using physical force. The fight itself is beyond GSM. It is more a question of physics: number of soldiers, available food, distances to travel, area to control etc. Nation states are not constituted on agreements but on military power over a territory. Physical power comes first. Agreements and deontic power follow. The idea of nation state sovereignty is exactly that the state does not exist on agreements between states or on common norms for control of territory, but on military power. When other states assign such legitimacy it is after the fact of military control.

Given this is true, it has effects into all organizations and activities within the state's borders. The state is the real owner of its territory (land, water and air space), the operative owner, even if the state elite/the political class argues that it is its people, its nation that is the owner, with the state as the nation's humble servant. That means the state, especially the public sector with its sovereignty-wielding organizations, is an underlying authority and potential force for all activities on/in the territory. All civilian rights are in this sense assigned rights. All organizations in the private sector have at some level public/state acceptance/approval. Even speech-acting at the basic locutionary level is under public control – at some level (for example. the routine state control of all internet activity). This physical power more or less

conditions all private activity and gives specific structural and substantive content to all public organizations. If this is true, it assigns importance to the democratic process, to the routine of citizen election of rulers, even if that process itself is under the same public/state control (Pizzorno 1990).

Also for this reason all hierarchic organizations tend to create group and class divisions. Classes are categories of people dependent upon other putative categories, either as super- or subordinates. A political class is dependent upon non-state groups electing or accepting members of the political class – or the political class as a whole. Owners of means of production are dependent upon the employment of wage workers/wage labor for work-free income.⁸ The private sector privileges private interests of persons, firms and organizations. In effect they are not obliged to take public interests into their activities. Politics is seen as activity primarily in the public sector. Politics has its limitations. Politics must not threaten the state: political actors must for example not suggest a new state. That equals revolution, which is illegal; politics should be interest based, that is based in the interests of a section of the society, making for competition for positions in the state apparatus (pluralism).

GSM suggests that these nation state structures in reasonably democratic nation states are reproduced in language conventions, or constitute/set boundaries for how to speak about the state (the nation's common leadership), politics (plural interests) and private activities (legitimately egoistic). Class teaches its members their language (Bourdieu 1987). The formats of discourse are for the same reason different in public and private organizations. Among employees in public organizations private interests are banned. In private firms politics out of bounds, except if owners actively allow. Public organizations must in principle be open for all, must publicly argue in a manner that is consistent with common law, and must not antagonize any specific legitimate group or person except when law so requires. As institutions limit and constitute what is said and done in the locutionary process (level 2) so nation-state and social class limit and constitute what is said and done within organizations in both sectors (level 4). That does not mean that there is not locutionary freedom, but that the freedom is selectively institutionally structured.

It is for this reason that the GAPS are so important (given they exist as described). It is in the GAPS that persons can freely go to the bottom and the reality of their experiences and value

⁸ Owners of machinery, buildings etc. can rent those things to firms, but to have access to profits from using those things, owners need to employ "their own" workers. Ellerman 1995.

systems and choose freely to act, if they so will, innovatively and in more or less contradiction to institutional rules and regulations. That discourse and willingness is certainly dependent upon membership in a collective of some sort that will support “critical” propositions and actions.

VIII Conclusion: GSM: the dynamic between innovation and control

Speech-acting is ubiquitous in both knowledge production and project/policy developments, in cognitive and volitional activity. Speech-acting generates organization and administers influence and power-wielding in micro and macro in societies. Speech-acting generates rationality, the competence of reasoned actions. That reasoning is developed in the time-space gaps between externalized interventions. In those gaps there is a fundamental freedom where persons unfold most of their capacities for knowledge production, situation analysis and innovative capacity. That freedom and creativity is ubiquitous. It springs from the capacity for abstract language. However, all speech-acting unfolds in institutionalized contexts. Speech-acting generates those institutions and is in varying ways limited by them. The GSM, the generative speech-act model, tries to capture and operationalize this dual dynamic, the creativity and its institutionalized support and limitations. The model assumes that a specific empirical organizational reality can be studied at different levels of abstraction. The GSM as here developed suggests four levels: the micro-locutionary process, its institutional setting, GSM as decision-making in organized collective groups and GSM of nation-state organization, the latter level having a not easily seen, but profound influence on the other levels of reality. Nation states are not products of speech-act generated agreements, nor are they subsumed from commonly agreed upon norms for distribution of territory between nations. Nation states are constituted on military control of territory. That means violent power, in the format of police and soldiers, permeates all activity within and between nation states. This fact is most succinctly expressed in the concept of sovereignty. On the one hand this may explain the prevalence of war-making. On the other it may be a last guarantee of cultural, linguistic and institutional variation and multiplicity. The GSM in this way captures/conceptualizes (ideally at least) the most creative power in human speech-acting and ability to make agreements creating collectivities, obligations and responsibilities and perhaps the most repressive of institutionalized physical power seen so far, in nation-states, alone and in varying forms of international alliances.

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