VEBLEN’S IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract: Veblen’s Imperial Germany is a theory of development and industrialization, and the role the business enterprise played in these processes. Through a reassessment of Veblen’s Imperial Germany, this paper explores the main aspects that Veblen considered about the industrialization of England and Germany, deriving theoretical implications for the preconditions of a successful industrialization and development, based on an evolutionary Institutional perspective. Veblen’s analysis is then used to analyze the current state of the industrialization of Latin America, evaluating the last two decades since the 1990s, and comparing the orthodox approach, the neostructural view and the veblenian perspective, arguing for the validity of a policy framework not reduced only to targeted protectionism but emphasizing the necessity of generating the institutional preconditions suggested by Veblen in his seminal work.

Keywords: Veblen, Industrialization, Latin America

JEL Classification Codes: B25, B52, O25

1. Introduction

During the last thirty years the atmosphere for industrial policies in Latin America has been very unsympathetic. The process of import substitution industrialization (ISI) that the region endured during fifty years since the 1930s, has been demonized subjected to a black legend. However, despite the predominance of orthodox economic policies since the 1990s, industrial policies are coming back, and policy makers, governments and academia, are tackling the subject again. However, the discussion now faces new circumstances, compared with the ‘old’ industrialization, characterized now by a globalized world and complex processes of trade agreements with the US, Europe and other regions, and between the same Latin American countries as well. Our main

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argument in this paper however claims that an industrialization process does not depend only on government decisions, tariffs and policy designs aimed to foster it. As we can learn from Thorstein Veblen, the generation and strengthening of an industrial process in a specific nation stems also from the state of industrial arts and the social, institutional and cultural fabric of a society as Veblen used to state. It usually has implied an ability to 'borrow' science and technology from more advanced societies, with a crucial role for collective and individual agency to promote industrialization, aiming not only to supply domestic markets but to be integrated in complex ways within the global economy. Moreover, an industrialization process requires a strategic vision of a nation, and a political command at the state level, understanding the need to have a strong industrial sector able to survive in the world economy.

Latin America is today undergoing a political process where two blocs are emerging: one set of countries remain faithful to the Washington Consensus, and the other one is experimenting new approaches on development from more heterodox perspectives not exempted from mistakes that always occurred. However, in all countries with outward oriented economies and free market approaches, a new industrialization has not emerged magically from competitiveness, and premature 'deindustrialization’ processes have been observed. The need for industrial policies is slowly becoming evident if a nation wants to survive successfully in the world economy.

2. An appraisal of Veblen’s *Imperial Germany*

Veblen’s *Imperial Germany* (Veblen, 1964 [1915]) is in fact a theory of industrialization, development and the business enterprise. It deals not only with the case of Germany before World War I but it is linked to Veblen’s view on Japan’s industrialization. As Dorfman puts it, ”The scope of Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution extends far beyond the case of Germany” (Dorfman, 1964 [1935]). By the same token, this book is similar to ”The opportunity of Japan” (Veblen, 1915) written when Veblen was a professor at the University of Missouri.

Veblen’s endeavor was oriented to explain the rapid and successful industrialization of Germany despite being previously submerged in feudalism combined with a dynastic state. Germany’s success occurred because of its ability to restrain pecuniary behavior, and avoiding at the same time the penalty of taking the lead in the initial stages of Europe’s industrialization. Going back through ancient times, Veblen accomplishes a careful and detailed anthropological research about the Baltic people since the Stone Age, describing the mixing of races. He underlines ”hereditary characteristics of
temperament, intelligence and physique"  (Veblen, 1964 [1915]: 4), finding difference of use and wants among different peoples. To Veblen, the ‘scheme of institutions’ implanted in any given community imply institutions such as the language, that is somewhat unstable and that varies trough time, accompanied by other habits and heredity more stable with a strong enduring character (Veblen, 1964 [1915]: 5). However Veblen views this scheme of institutions from an evolutionary perspective in a Darwinian’s sense. Despite the mixture of races he observes in the Baltic people, Veblen points out “these psychological traits -spiritual and intellectual proclivities, capacities, aptitudes, sensibilities” (Veblen: 10-11), which becomes the raw material that the scheme of civilization is built on.

A very crucial theoretical element proposed by Veblen in his analysis of German industrialization is the concept of ‘merits of borrowing’ which describes the process of learning and transferring knowledge and technology from others and cultures (Veblen: 21). For the case of the Baltic peoples, Veblen traces back this process as a characteristic trait of these people. From here he derives an important conclusion, underlying powerful implications of the ‘borrowing’:

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...as a matter of history, technological innovations and creation of an institutional nature have in many cases reached their fullest serviceability only at the hands of other communities and other peoples than those whom these cultural elements owed their origin and initial success” (Veblen: 24).

Based on these premises, Veblen analyses the symbiosis between the state of the industrial arts of a nation and the scheme of magical, religious, conventional or pecuniary use and wont of a society (Veblen: 37). Within this relationship, once a community introduces a ‘borrowed’ structure of industrial arts, there is the possibility that ‘conventional inhibitions and waste’ of the original society can be eliminated, in using the new elements of industrial efficiency with more liberty and ability to use it with enabling capacities (Veblen: 38). That is the reason why the borrowing society could end up in a better position compared with the original society from which innovations were taken.

Later, under these assumptions, Veblen explores the conditions of the ‘older society’ characterized by a ‘pagan anarchy’, followed by the creation of the ‘dynastic state’ of the German people, based on predatory behavior and immersed in an imitation of feudalism. The change of this situation came up by the end of the XIX century when industrialization emerged and increased the power of this nation and not precisely an ethereal German Spirit (Veblen : 62). Based in previous efforts of improving the educational system, the nation was able to assimilate the new habits of thoughts of the industrial system, using the dynastic state itself to foster this industrialization. This process of technological development did not surge from Germany itself but it was borrowed from other English-speaking people such as England (Veblen: 85). But the new
industrial system was introduced without the institutional matrix and convictions that permeated the original owners. Thus, Veblen now devotes a very long chapter of the book to describe the case of England, illustrating us with a complete applied institutional analysis of the industrialization process of the British, who also borrowed from the Dutch the arts of ship-building and navigation (Veblen : 96).

Veblen describes the specific nature of the English evolutionary process of industrialization where geographical conditions of being an island played a role, and the development at the same time of the judiciary and a mentality that identified reality with ‘materiality’, that induce human activities toward industry and trade instead of war and politics (Veblen: 105-112). In England the scheme of industrial arts was able to build from the handicraft system, behaviors that were based on the instincts of workmanship and the logic of the industrial activities in a way that were passed to engineering. According to Veblen, British industrialization paid a penalty for leading the process, affected by obsolescence and hindered by conspicuous consumption of the traditional elites, which imposed a burden on the accumulation process.

At variance with the England experience, during the Imperial Germany, the role of the state is overwhelming. According to Veblen, the citizen became the subject of the state. The sovereignty was not in the people but in the state (Veblen: 162). This ideology led the Germans to concentrate efforts in the military build up of the state. The industrial arts was oriented to that purpose, generating a material basis for militarism with tragic consequences for the world in the XX century.

An interesting point that Veblen exposes is his analysis of the conditions of living of the German people is his approach on the wage level of a society,

“The scale of expenditure that so comes to be standardized and accepted as the staple of decency in any class or community is determined roughly by what the habitual income of the class or community will support in the way of wasteful consumption” (Veblen: 209).

In this scenario, Veblen understood that culture was an intangible asset characterized by a balanced system of habits of though, which is the crucial definition Veblen gives us about what institutions are. In the case of the German people, they were able to undergo a transition from a ‘romantic’ era to a society with a ‘matter of fact’ logics and inner qualities of modern technology within the field of applied sciences, are going to prevail.

One critique that Veblen made to German industrialization, which is valid even today, is directed to an industrial policy self-centered only in the domestic market. In his opinion, this inward vision is going to impose inefficiencies and a process of obstruction to the expansion of industrial activities across countries. Veblen pointed out that efficient
Industrialization could only be achieved generating output for domestic and external markets (Veblen: 242). Modern industrial arts cannot be based therefore only on national frontiers, requiring raw materials from domestic and external sources.

Following Veblen, modern civilization implies a pervasive habit of thought that he describes as ‘the mechanistic conception’, which stems from the machine technology and the development of exact sciences. He goes further to assert that free or popular institutions are correlated with the degree of industrialization, rejecting old habits of thought such as “coercion, personal dominion, self-abasement, subjectivism, loyalty, suspicion, duplicity, ill-will, -these things do not articulate well with the mechanistic conception” (Veblen: 269). In other words, industrialization requires an institutional matrix of habit of thoughts favoring the machine process and vice versa. Under this perspective, Veblen was able to explain the problems of the dynastic state in Germany, as it was completely inadequate to the needs of the industrial system. Institutional adjustments were thus required in the Imperial Germany.

In the supplementary notes at the end of Imperial Germany, Veblen characterize important features regarding American business, underlyings its “financial character” (Veblen: 339), where the incentives were aimed to the market of securities instead of producing goods and services, under the powerful umbrella of the investment banker who at the end will take the main decisions instead the engineering staff of the productive sphere. Here Veblen envisions our modern troubles during the Great Recession of 2008, where the economy was under the command of the money manager capitalism describe by Hyman Minsky. Veblen also analyzed the situation of Japan (Veblen, 1915) where he describes the institutional change that was happening in Japan, another “borrowing” society that was showing at that time an impressive industrial development and change of habits of thoughts carefully described by Veblen despite deep conservative traditions that permeated Japan’s society. The problem with Japan, as in the case of Germany, was that a dynastic state was using the industrial arts for warlike purposes. This new efficiency was implemented toward a militaristic competition with western powers during the First and Second World Wars, as foreseen by Veblen (Veblen, 1915: 37-38).

From Veblen’s Imperial Germany it is clear that a successful industrialization process implies always “borrowing” technologies from other societies, taking advantage of the “merits” of borrowing, and developing a more efficient machine process adapted to the institutional matrix of the nation based on an evolutionary process of adaptation, emulation and innovation. Henceforth, the outcome of these processes are not going to depend just from tariffs, barriers to trade, urbanization, or exchange rate policies, but on the capacity of the recipient society to transform its habit of thoughts and the correct
articulation with the political and social structures embedded in the society, combined with correct individual and collective agency. Moreover, if the political sphere is not coherent with the demands of the machine process, as in the case of dynastic states analyzed here, the final outcome could be problematic and unable to generate a modern society. The process will deviate to wars and deep social and political conflicts.

3. Main features of the industrialization of Latin America

As industrial policies are returning to the academic and policy making discussions, reassessing the experience of industrialization in Latin America is needed from an institutional perspective. The European and Asian experiences, although very specific compared with Latin America, have generated important lessons for the world. As Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz (Cimoli et al., 2009: 19) put it,

"...all industrial experiences of sustained economic growth find their enabling conditions in a rich set of complementary institutions, shared behavioral norms, and public policies....discretionary policies have been ingredients of national development strategies...(where ). Institutions and policies always matter in all process of technological learning and economic coordination and change..."

All expectations that were assumed during the last two decades of the last century, that a new restructuring of developing economies based on comparative and competitive advantages dictated by the principle of market competition failed. New industries did not blossom spontaneously, and the Chinese experience ruled by a developmental state pointed in a different direction. On the other hand, industrialization in Far East countries was quite different from the Latin American experience. One striking characteristic of this experience was that the process of industrialization was based more on the role of business enterprises which exploited higher learning opportunities and demand elasticity embedded with a clear command of industrial policies fostered by the state. At variance with this case, in Latin America, the relationship between the state and the private sector was more indulgent over inefficiencies and based on rent-seeking accumulation patterns under the umbrella of selected protectionism (Cimoli et al., 2009: 28).
3.1. The Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)

The ISI 'strategy' in Latin America stemmed spontaneously from the Great Depression and the II World War. The process was more intense in those countries with more preconditions for industrialization, especially the larger and median economies, and it emerged without previous planning or state oriented policies. It was the result as Veblen used to say an outcome of ‘facts of life’. During the 1950s, ECLA’s theory just elaborated about ISI, but it was not an outcome of this theoretical elaboration. Praxis preceded theory. In some sense, Latin America did the same that the US, Germany and England did using protectionism in previous times. However, against the legend about ISI, the purpose was not just to protect an inefficient industry, but also to use this phase as a base for promoting export sectors. ISI was not seen as a process opposed intrinsically against the outward oriented strategy but complementary to it. (Cimoli et al., 2009: 117).

The ISI experience was positive until the 1970s. But the strategy was not coupled "with incentive schemes to promote efficiency and domestic competition" (Cimoli et al., 2009: 119). The problem was not the ISI model but the lack of complementary policies such as export-promoting ones, and mechanisms of guaranteeing domestic competition. But behind these deficiency of internal policies, the powerful reasons behind this situation was the institutional matrix that pervades in most of Latin American countries during those times, such as an extreme role of landowners and commercial interests that impeded the expansion of domestic markets and hindered the modernization of the Latin-American societies. There was a partial “partial borrowing” of modern technology from Western countries but not in Veblen’s terms: some modernization was introduced in our societies, but without modernity. Political and social institutions were partially modernized but operated at the will of oligarchic states.

In Latin America one does not find a strong role for development banks in promoting industrialization in order to give exporting firms long run subsidized capital such as it happened in South Korea and Taiwan, nor the role of public banks we have today in China. Chile achieved some success with the experience of CORFO and Colombia with the IFI. Brazil also attempted some policies, but all these state organizations were liquidated or reoriented through the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. ISI strategy in order to be successful required good public bureaucracies and lack of corruption. But the traditional elites used ISI policy for rent seeking behavior, not being able to change their habits of mind that a successful industrialization was supposed to require.

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1 A good review of the ISI experience in Latin America can be found in Fitzgerald work about the ECLA theory (Fitzgerald, 2000).
At variance with the Latin American experience, Far East economies were able to build a developmental state. Export growth was a consequence of explicit investment policies. A “picking winner” strategy worked well in most of cases against orthodox assumptions. The “borrowing” process exposed by Veblen was a success. Incentives and discipline were put in place, an assumption that was absent in Latin America. (Cimoli et al., 2009: 124).

The ISI strategy was very popular at the academic realm but in practical terms it suffered many limitations: 1) In many countries were domestic-market oriented, with a bias against exports; 2) a chronic inability to evaluate the policies through time; 3) A bureaucracy with a very low quality, and the weakness of a civil service; 4) Very low levels of expenditure in education and R&D in terms of GDP as the elites did not give great importance to human capital investments; 5) A strong opposition by the traditional landowner classes to progressive policies that would emphasize a better income and assets distribution; 6) A languid role of the state in controlling strategic inputs, banks and industries and 7) A rentier-attitude of the capitalist class to the working rules of the society. (Cimoli et al., 2009: 126)

3.2. The Neoliberal Reforms: Dismantling Industrial Policies

Under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus industrial policies in Latin America began to fade. Industrial discretionary policies were abandoned in favor of horizontal supportive policies. In many cases the lemma was that the best industrial policy was to have no policy at all. The assumption was that with trade liberalization, competitive advantages would play a crucial role and should decide the creation of new industrial sectors. In addition, WTO rules and free trade agreements among nations imposed limitations in the use of subsidies and tariffs.

However, despite all the expectations at the beginning of the 90s of the last century, the real outcomes of these policies were very poor. Economic growth stagnated in the second half of the 90s. Facts of life began to suggest different models of economic policies in many Latin American countries with more pragmatic approaches reclaiming a major role for the state by the end of the 20th century. Based on the growing frustration of the people, Left and Center-left oriented governments began to win presidential elections. Under these conditions, the concept of “industrial policy” began to emerge again even with different emphasis in different nations according to their specific conditions. As “sound

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2 A good account of the limitations of the Ecla’s Theory in Latin America from different perspectives can be seen in Octavio Rodriguez’s work about this theory (Rodriguez, 1980).
macroeconomic policies” were imposed, characterized by budget austerity and central bank target inflation rules, it was evident every day that these stable macro conditions did not suffice for rapid economic growth, in a continent under social pressures for more inclusive development patterns. Public agenda began to change gradually toward a more complete package of industrial policies that anyway remained faithful to the “capabilities” approach, which limited the role of the state to specific policies such as to offer public goods and the infrastructure necessary to foster industrialization.

### 3.3. A weak return of industrial policies in Latin America (2000-2010)

At the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of “industrial policy” began to emerge again. The subject was not limited to Latin America and even in the OECD countries. Scholars began to tackle the issue. Moreover, orthodox institutions as the World Bank started to explore the subject. On the other hand, empirical evidence pointed clearly in the necessity to propose new directions in an area that has been abandoned.

As we can observe in Fig. 1, the Latin America Region was clearly stagnated in terms of the GDP per capita measured proportionally to the US per capita level. Despite the expectations in some countries with the primary export boom during the first decade, it was evident that economic success did not occur spontaneously. As Devlin and Molligansky (2012: 8) put it,

“...countries such as Finland, Sweden and Malaysia moved beyond their original dependence on an abundance of natural resources to diversify into much higher valued-added skill and knowledge-based products and activities. This did not happen via the “invisible hand” of the market, as public sector industrial policies of both a horizontal and vertical nature (including government procurement) helped build the local capacities needed to make the transition”.

Different strategies were put in practice in different countries in Latin America in order to face the slow dynamics of the export industrial sector. A common feature was apparently embedded in these policies: the preference for horizontal or supportive
Industrial policies guided by Porter’s ideas about competitiveness, assuming that governments should restrict themselves to the “capability approach”, generating equal incentives to the different subsector of the industrial production. Institutions were reduced to transaction costs in the “Doing Business”’s approach popularized by the World Bank. Hence, the role of the state was to improve infrastructure (roads, ports, utilities), to create credit oriented financial institutions and to improve the “Doing Business” variables by the tasks governments should undertake to reduce the transaction costs of exporting. Wilson Peres gives us a good account of all these policies that were implemented in different countries which in some sense differed deeply from the experience from the ISI period (Peres, 2006). The limitation of all
these policies stemmed from the fact that most of countries suffered from deficient ‘institutional capabilities’ needed to implement these policies. The problem gets bigger when governments tried to follow benchmark criteria of developed nations or ‘best practices’ that according to Peres has nothing to do with the inner reality of each country (Peres, 2006: 77). Moreover, as Latin American Governments are deeply centralized, major obstacles emerge when the policies are implemented at the subnational levels with weaker government capabilities.

However, we need to go deeper than Peres’s analysis. If we Follow Veblen’s insights, it is evident that nations that have not been able to build an institutional matrix molded in industrial behavior as Germany did during some period, which implied deep transformations of the educational and political system, the possibilities of achieving stronger industrial sector are complicated. The ‘borrowing process’ does not go very far, as it is reduced to some subsectors without irrigating their dynamics through the whole economic system. Horizontal industrial policies are very limited. Governments with a national vision on development and willing to take risks in sectors that are key to economic growth are necessary. Of curse crucial monitoring is needed to avoid waste of resources. But we need to learn from Veblen’s Imperial Germany that these policies imply a vision of developmental transformation. We agree that industrial policies are back in a different global framework, but the solution is not to be scare of vertical policies deeply combined with horizontal ones.3

The transformation of industrial policies into competitiveness policies has also originated a deviation in the export promotion issues: this theoretical conception claims that all sectors that export are considered as a part of the industrial one, leading to neglect the problematic consequences of using the mining sector as a leading sector of the economy. It is very common to listen from international advisers to claim that it is not important what you export, what really matters is that you export something, giving the same importance to mining, tourism and services. One cannot deny that these sectors are complementary but what we learn from a theory of development of society as Veblen showed, is that today the industrial sector plays a strategic role in achieving modernity. The early deindustrialization that Latin

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3 For this reason we are at odds with Ken Warwick’s (2013) paper which has very interesting points on the issue but he restricts industrial policies to horizontal ones. (Warwick, 2013)
American countries are suffering today should be seen as an economic illness and not as a natural process of economic growth.  

In Table 1 it can be observed that countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Brazil have been able to maintain an important level of their exports in manufacturing goods, where Mexico has been the strongest one, as it has integrated its economy with the US based on the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the development of maquilas at the border. Argentina has followed an heterodox path in economic policies maintaining 32.3% of its exports in manufacturing. Bolivia has suffered a huge deindustrialization of their exports due to the excessive role of the mining sector, and Chile and Colombia, the preferred countries by orthodox policies also have gone backward in the industrialization of their exports. Uruguay has also lost participation and Peru as well. However, in Table 2 only Brazil and Mexico reveal an important role of high tech exports to manufacturing exports, underlying the strong limitations of the horizontal approach, as they have a participation that is acceptable compared with the OECD countries. The weak results in this area underscore also the limitations of the capability approach in innovation where the ‘capabilities approach’ has been used. Most of policies have been designed to support small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) regarding credit mechanisms, educational and promotional strategies oriented to convert firms oriented to domestic markets in export ones. The public sector has tried to increase the funding of R &D strategies regarding applied research, but the results have not been remarkable.

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4 The case of Brazil is analyzed from a Kaldorian perspective in Mattos and Fevereiro (2014).

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Source: World Bank Indicators
One problem with the narrow vision on innovation implemented, is the limited idea that only the private sector is in charge of innovation. Hence the rationale goes in the direction of generating sufficient stimulus to foster enough innovative business enterprises. Based on the prejudice that the state cannot pick winners, public policy regarding R&D becomes very passive. As Mariana Mazzucato has shown, the rose story about private business enterprises developing innovation has nothing to do with reality (Mazzucato, 2013). In Latin America the notion of a developmental state needs to be recovered in order to foster industrialization despite the limitations of the new global environment. An important tool to achieve this purpose is to promote the creation of development banks funded total or partially by the state, despite the fiscal limitations.

If we recall Veblen’s theory, and if we avoid the deviations the state suffered during Imperial Germany, combined with the possibility to improve the quality of public policies, and the establishment of a solid civil service with an expertise in promoting industrialization, it is possible to combine the process of “borrowing” with the fostering of an institutional matrix prone to real industrialization. This will require different and less orthodox macroeconomic policies, taking advantage of partial sovereignty of money in many countries, especially the larger ones, and the strengthening of an educational sector more oriented to increase the workmanship of the population oriented to ‘industrial arts’ as Veblen used to say, instead the ceremonial activities. In his analysis of the experience of Germany and Japan, Veblen showed the importance of having an adequate vision of the nation regarding the state by the ruling elites. Industrialization is just not a choice for a country. Every nation has to be clever enough to locate its industrial activities in the correct sector to achieve competitiveness. But undoubtedly, development stems from industrialization, as these activities are the only ones capable to generate an institutional matrix that guarantee the process of development. As Alice Amsden states, "Manufacturing experience implied the existence

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SOURCE: World Bank Indicators
of entrepreneurs, managers, engineers, lawyers, accountants, an educated elite, a big student population, and a large working class in urban areas... but if industries gets too small, if unemployment gets too large, and if upward mobility becomes blocked, democracy will be defeated” (Amsden, 2007: 19). In other words, industrialization becomes the material base of a modern society and an adequate institutional framework oriented to a more progressive and inclusive one.

4. Conclusions

Veblen’s analysis on Germany, England and Japan showed that different “cultural lines” in industrial development have been followed in order to coordinate the new state of ‘industrial arts’, in Veblen’s words, with the institutional matrix of each country and the requirements of a globalized world.

The institutional characteristics of the state moving in a coordinated manner with the industrial sector are crucial to the process of development. It requires a specific institutional design of industrial policies to foster development. These policies have to go further from the ‘capability approach’ used so far.

“Borrowing” is a historical process, key to industrial policies, but every nation has to guarantee that corruption and inefficient bureaucracies do not hamper the ‘net gain’. Decisive individual and collective agency is crucial.

There is not a unique recipe for achieving industrialization in each country. The experience will be diverse and complex. Veblen’s approach points out the necessity to combine industrialization with an institutional framework able to guarantee a real change of habits of thoughts in the society. Industrialization is not just a matter of tariffs, barriers to trade, credits or incentives. Rent seeking behavior, corruption and predation impose huge limits to a successful industrial accumulation.

Industrialization policies could be horizontal-oriented, but there is room for ‘vertical’ policies as India’s and China’s experience revealed. Exporting ‘potato chips’ is not the same that exporting ‘microchips’.

The reprimarization of exports in many Latin American countries could be an obstacle if industrial policies are not implemented actively. Dutch disease is still a problem today.

Processes of R&D in Latin America need to be implemented, but with a vision that goes far beyond a ‘supportive’ but timid state. The need of development banking is also
crucial for financing new industries and taking new risks in different projects. It is worthy to do it. It is the only path to real modernity.

References


