1. Introduction

In general, two currents are predominant in institutional theory, economic and sociological. The former aims to explain the role of institutions in economic development, whereas the latter focuses on their role in ensuring social stability. For the present study, the theoretical cut is in the sociological current.

Assuming that institutions are susceptible of change corroborates in highlighting the core role of agency. Agency and institutions are key concepts in institutional theory, configuring the social dualism, which is inherited from how social theories are parameterised, on one hand, by determinism and, on the other, by voluntarism (Abdelnour, Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2017; Alexander, 1992; Parker, 2000). The former advocates that, when a social actor performs an action, it is determined by the institutional structure, whereas, in the latter, the social agent performs the action through freedom. Both, with their distinct orientations, have influenced analytic approaches of sociological institutionalism.

The new organisational institutionalism, i.e., organisational neoinstitutionalism, emerged from the works of Berger and Luckmann (1998). From this perspective, institutions are understood as sets of beliefs, habits and values, coming from a social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1998). The ‘action’ in social construction of reality is dependent on social actors belonging to a social group; the belonging comes from social actors who internalise the meaning systems of their respective context.

The institution concept started being worked into organisational studies from the 1970’s (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). From this perspective, institutions are understood as sets of rules, scripts and classifications; here, the continuity of the organisations is earned through the ceremonial adoption of elements that constitute the institutions and that determine the 'action' (Popadiuk, Rivera & Bataglia, 2012).

In the 1990’s has been developed the analytical approach of institutional logics (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012) defined as organising principles that shape the behaviour of the agents (Reay & Hinnings, 2009) and, consequently, the ‘action’. The central purpose of this approach is to explain institutional change; however, it is observed
that change comes from the combination of existing logics, and there is an absence of studies that explain how new institutional rationalities emerge.

All of these analysis approaches are based on the assumptions of the 'deterministic perspective' for understanding the institutional life; here, the actors are mere epiphenomena of the institutional structure. The central criticism of the deterministic perspective is grounded in the idea that social actors do not only perform their actions in conformity with the institutions; in other words, the social actors do more than simply follow institutional standards (Dorado, 2005). From this critique, new agency-centered approaches in organisational institutionalism emerged, such as the ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (DiMaggio, 1988; Mutch, 2007) and ‘institutional work’ approaches (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009; 2011). This movement is referred to as the ‘agentic turn’ (Abdelnour, Hasselbradh & Kallinikos, 2017).

The institutional entrepreneur analytic approach aims to understand the practices developed by social actors capable of creating a new institution (Eisenstadt, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988). This perspective of analysis tends to overestimate 'one' actor. However, it has been observed that, in this approach, it is not clear how a social actor immersed in an institutional context can create new institutions; concomitantly, this analysis approach presents a mistaken view to the assuming that an actor is capable of creating new institutions. In this approach, ‘agency’ is understood as actions performed by superheroes (Bitektine & Haack, 2015).

The institutional work has focused on the practices performed by the actors, as well as the various impacts that they can make on the institutions, i.e., creation, maintenance and disruption (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009; 2011). In this approach, 'agency' is defined in terms of reflective capability. The development of new practices is dependent on the degree of reflexivity of the social actors (Abdelnour, Hasselbradh & Kallinikos, 2017); however, it fails to expose the underlying mechanisms that involve the reflexive process. Both institutional entrepreneur and institutional work presents a 'micro-sociological perspective' for explaining institutions, in which the actors are transformed into social agents.

There is an effort for understanding the institutional process; however, analysis approaches in organisational institutionalism presents the institutional process in a fragmented way. In the approaches before the macro-sociological perspective there is a predominance for understanding how homogeneity process occurs, whereas, the approaches before the micro-sociological perspective aims to understand the heterogeneity through new social practices.

Based on the reasoning in the previous paragraphs, we can formulate the question of this study: how process of institutional change occur, considering from the emergence to the establishment of new social practices? The institutions in this study are understood as recurrent social practices.

We understand that the institutional work analytic approach presents a new perspective for understanding the institutional dynamics through social practices (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009; 2011), it is a new movement in institutional theory referred to as 'practice turn'; although, it is observed that there is an absence of studies
that aims to explain how the new practices emerge and become consolidated at the field level (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007).

Thus, this study suggest a conceptual model for understanding the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, considering from the emergence to the establishment new social practices. The model is based on the micro-foundations approach, in which the institutional process is understood in terms of social interactions.

The basis of the micro-foundations is the theory of structuration of Anthony Giddens, providing assumptions based on the praxiological approach; here, structure and action are constituent elements; in other terms, structure and action are involved in a dynamic relationship and indissociable, being materialized in social practices.

Giddens (1984) was emphatic to the configuring the action of the social agents as fruit both rationalisation of the action, i.e., practical consciousnesses, and reflexive monitoring, i.e., discursive consciousnesses, that emanates from the structural properties, i.e. rules. Both consciousnesses are based on a praxiological approach.

Concurrently, both the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1989) and the theoretical extension of institutional work (Lawrence, Suddaby, Leca, 2009, 2011) pointed out that the recognition of the institutionalized standards is dependent on the reflexivity. This reflexivity is important, but it is not enough for fostering a change in social structures. For this reason, reflective consciousness is included in the conceptual model, being based on the assumptions of the ‘Philosophy of the Will’ of Paul Ricouer. The reflexivity in the ricorian conception is defined as a non-immediate reading of social reality, as well as the their impacts on the social world; in others terms, the Ricoeur’s reflective consciousness contemplates the connection between reason and action.

The establishment of a new social practices is result of a collective negotiation at the intra-organisational and interorganisational levels, through the use of the power. The power is responsible by capacitating the action, based on the resources that constitute the structural properties. The configuration of the power in theory of structuration breaks with the dualism between agentic power and structural power.

The theoretical contributions of this study are based on the proposed model, in which was conceived from the assumptions of the organisational neoinstitutionalism (Berger & Luckmann; 1998; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001; Ocasio; Lounsbury, 2012; Lawrence; Suddaby; Leca, 2009; 2011; Popadiuk, Rivera & Bataglia, 2014) of the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1989) and of the reflexive philosophy (Ricouer, 1950; 1960).

The following four advances are proposed: i) inclusion of the variable ‘time’ into institutional process; ii) inclusion of the variable ‘power’ into process of establishing of changes in the institutional scope; iii) process of global institutional change, considering from the emergence to the establishment of new social practices; and iv) breaking of the paradox concerning to the dualism between action and structure.

This study is organised into six sections, including this introduction. The second section addresses the central assumptions of the organisational neoinstitutionalism regarding the institutionalisation process and the notion of social actors as social agents.
2. Institutional Theory
2.1 New Organisational Institutionalism: institutional process

New organisational institutionalism, also known as organisational neo-institutionalism, emerged from the works of Berger and Luckmann (1998), presenting a ‘micro sociological perspective’ for understanding institutions. On this approach, institutions are defined as being sets of beliefs, habits and values that structure the cognition of the social actors. This definition corroborates in disregarding the ‘power’ concept in institutional analysis, since it is understood that the meanings systems are internalised by the social actors in a consensual way.

For these authors, institutions are created from a social construction of reality. This construction is a process of interaction between the social actors that creates reciprocal typifications that regulate both behaviour and interpretations (Bataglia & Pellegrino, 2012); it is convergent with the definitions proposed by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) and Phillips and Malhotra (2008).

The ‘institutional process’ is constituted by institutionalisation and legitimisation. The former is constituted by socialisation, via the externalisation of the thoughts of actors, their objectification in symbolic systems and the internalisation through which these symbolic systems are internalised. Meanwhile, the externalisation of the thoughts is the final product of a process that the consciousness come back to itself and to the world, fostering new ways of understanding the social reality.

The latter is legitimisation, which rationally justifies the established institutions for the social group (Berger & Luckmann, 1998). Thus, once created, the meanings system will gradually acquire the moral status that shapes the interactions and future negotiations (Barley & Tolbert, 1997).

In this approach, the 'time' concept is defined in terms of socio-cultural and historical context (Berger & Luckmann, 1998). The socio-cultural context is important for characterising and justifying the institutions at a particular moment in the history, based on the conception of the being of dasein (Heidegger, 1988). On the other hand, this renders it as a simplistic view, since the institutionalisation must be parameterised by events that occur over time.

The proposal of Berger and Luckmann (1998) evidences, at first, the central role of the social actors in the construction of the social life; thus, the institutional environment is constructed through the interaction between actors and social facts. On the other hand, it is observed that the social construction theory does not exclude 'structural determinism', since the human becomes a social actor as they internalise the meanings systems; action in the social construction of reality emanates from the collective meanings system.
The institution concept began to be worked into organisational studies from the 1970s (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Barley & Tolbert, 1997), being developed in response to the ‘macro-sociological perspective’. From this perspective, institutions are defined as sets of rules, scripts and classifications (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). For Scott, institutions are constituted of "cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that together with associated activities and resources provides stability and meaning for the social life" (2001: 48).

The regulatory and normative spheres corroborate one another in forming a conception of institutional environment, presenting an authoritative character, since, in an institutionalised context, there is a greater control, implying an absence of alternatives for the actions (Zucker, 1977). The institution, then, presents a substantial force in restricting the action of the social actors. Therefore, the institutional environment is constituted by a perspective of cognitive supersocialisation (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Scott, 1995; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). It is observed that, there is the mention of the cognitive aspect; however, the normative is highlighted; the 'power' concept is neglected in the studies of the organisational neoinstitutionalism, being defined in structural terms. The power is characterized as a variable both of the Law and of the public opinion.

DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 64), in trying to answer "why there is such startling homogeneity of forms and organisational practices?" invariably fell for the legitimacy concept, this being the basis for understanding the behaviour and structure of the organisations (Johnson, Melin & Whittington, 2003).

Legitimacy is understood as a symbolic value, based on the perceptions of the social actors, who understand that certain behaviours and actions are in conformity with the norms and values of a socially constructed context (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995). In order to gain legitimacy, organisations conform to the scripts, rules and classifications that constitute an institution (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In other words, the legitimacy arises from ceremonial adoption (Popadiuk, Rivera & Bataglia, 2014), presenting a 'deterministic perspective'.

Homogeneity, a characteristic of the legitimacy phase of institutionalisation, indicates that the field has reached maturity. At this stage, organisations tend to have the same practices and behaviours (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). It is explicit that the central focus of the studies is on the homogeneity of organisational forms; in other words, they aims to explain the domination of the institutions. Organisational neoinstitutionalism invariably looks at how the institutional environment defines and restricts action; the process of institutional change is seen at a punctuated moment, more specifically at the homogeneity phase; however, is it observed that there is an absence of studies that explaining how heterogeneity occurs within a field.

More recently, a new analytic approach has been developed with the central objective of understanding complexity and institutional change, which is known as the institutional logics approach. The former occurs when there are various logics located in the same field (Lounsbury, 2007); complexity can be measured by the number of logics that coexist within a field or the degree of compatibility between them (Lounsbury, 2002; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003).
The latter occurs when one logic is replaced by another (Thornton, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Scott (2001) pointed out that institutional change can emerge in the following three ways: i) the creation of a logic; ii) the dissolution of an existing logic; and iii) an existing logic is replaced by a new one. The change in this analysis approach is understood in exogenous terms, being based on the combination of properties of divergent logics that are present in a context. Concomitantly, there is an absence of studies that explain how new logics emerge and, consequently, what are the main mechanisms related to the process of creating a new institutional rationality.

However, the studies in this analysis approach have focused on existing rationales, reporting their effects on the actions of the social actors (Thornton, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007), presenting a ‘deterministic perspective’. In this perspective, the logics determine the ‘actions’ of organizations; in other words, from the existing properties that constitute a logic, that the social actors perform the activities that demarcate an institutional field. This approach presents the idea that the behavior of an organization can be explained by their adherence to an institutional logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991).

Thornton and Ocasio (2008) asserted that institutional logics are socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including the assumptions, values and beliefs by which individuals and organisations give meaning to their daily activities, organise the relationship of space and time, and by which they are socially reproduced. Institutional logics are organising principles which shape and structure the cognition of the social actors (Reay & Hinnings, 2009; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012), and are responsible by defining the cognitive abilities of the actors that guide the interpretations of their experiences, indicating the correct way to behave (Thornton, 2004). In light of this, institutional logics influence the way of understanding and interacting in collective life (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012), disregarding the ‘power’ concept in the institutional analysis, since the meanings systems are responsible in structuring the cognition of the social actors.

The institutional logics analytic approach presents a ‘macro-sociological perspective’ for understanding the institutional dynamics. It is explicit in Friedland and Alford’s (1991) when they contextualise the society as an interinstitutional system constituted by several sectoral systems, each one acts in a given social space. In other words, each sectoral system has a set of expectations that is reflected in the behaviour of the social actors. Based on the perspective of interinstitutional system is possible to understand the heterogeneity of sources that influences the social actors; thus, the field can be formed by properties comes from several sectoral systems (Thornton, 2002; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lounsbury, 2002; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Sonpar, Handelman & Dastmalchian, 2009).

In the new organisational neoinstitutionalism, the social actors are mere epiphenomena of the institutional structure. Nevertheless, in recent decades, a theoretical effort has been made to consider agency in the institutional dynamics, with this change of emphasis being referred to as the ‘agentic turn’ (Abdelnour, Hasselbradt & Kallinikos, 2017). Two analytical approaches stand out as attempts at explaining institutional change: i) institutional entrepreneur (Eisenstadt, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988; Holm, 1995; Beckert, 1999; Mutch, 2007); and ii) institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009, 2011).
2.2 The Agentic Turn: actors as social agents

Eisenstadt (1980) coined the 'institutional entrepreneur' term, which refers to the social actors that are organised enough and possess sufficient resources for creating a new institution. Subsequently, DiMaggio (1988) used this concept in an attempt to answer the question of "how institutions emerge?" For this author, the institutional entrepreneur concept is central for understanding institutional processes, as the institutional entrepreneur is able to create new institutions (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002). This approach explicitly adopts the 'micro-sociological perspective' for explaining the institutional dynamics.

Assuming that an individual is capable of creating or changing an institution, this approach presents a simplistic view, since an individual is not able to gather all the resources necessary for creating an institution (Suddaby & Greenwoods, 2005). In view of this, Leblebici et al. (1991) pointed out that the creation of an institution requires a variety of social actors, each with different attributions, evidencing a collective action in the institutional process.

Wijen and Ansari (2007) pointed out how the analytic approach of institutional entrepreneur can explain collective decisions. Collective action acts in complex conditions constituted of divergent interests and dispersed actors. The resolution of divergent interests drives both change and creation of new institutions, and requires attributes that often transcend the capacity of single actors, i.e., institutional entrepreneurs.

The institutional entrepreneur analytic approach does not explain how social actors immersed into institutional contexts are capable of creating new institutions; Beckert (1999) pointed out for the high analytical ability, presenting a 'rational perspective'. It is convergent with Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009) when they emphasized that the institutional entrepreneur presents a heroic rationalism.

However, the contribution of the institutional entrepreneur approach has been re-insert into studies of the institutional theory the 'agency' and their relationship with the institutions; there was, then, a reformulation in the agency concept, concerning the their capacity in participating of the institutional process (Abdelnour, Hasselbradt & Kallinikos, 2017).

Both change and creating of institutions is fundamental to consider the concept of immersed agency, since the social actor have the legitimacy or belonging to a respective social group as they meets the institutionalized standards; in this context, the 'reflexive ability' is central for transcending the institutional numbness, enabling to the social actor to does a non-naive reading of the social reality.

Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 2015) defined an alternative proposal centered on the institutional work as being a "[…] purposeful action of individuals and organisations for the creation, maintenance and disruption of institutions […]." More recently, Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2011, p.52) re-defined the institutional work concept as being the "[…] practices of individual and collective actors that aim at the creation, maintenance or disruption of institutions."
The central proposal of this analytic approach is to identify the actions developed by the social actors that impact the social structures and institutions (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009), presenting a *micro-sociological perspective*. The agency is performed intentionally, since the aim is to obtain a specific result.

For Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2011) the action is only triggered after the social actor, through a *cognitive effort*, recognises the institutionalised standards, these being a source both of reflexivity and of institutional continuity.

The *reflexivity* is based on the institutional patterns embedded in the social routines, and the actions responsible in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions are dependent on the reflexivity degree (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011); this variation at the reflexivity level is responsible in developing practices that will impact the institutions, i.e., creation, maintenance, and disruption. However, it is observed that there is an absence of underlying mechanisms; in other words, it is not clear what are the parameters for assessing the reflexivity degree (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011). Here, the agency is defined in terms of *reflective capacity* (Abdelnour, Hasselbladt & Kallinikos, 2017).

The *power* is neglected both institutional entrepreneur and institutional work, since the institutionalisation is described as a process that occurs in a consensual way among the social actors. It is a simplistic view, since the institutional change breaks the status quo; in other words, there are existing conflicts due to the presence of divergent interests among social actors.

These analysis approaches contemplates the institutional process through the social practices; however, it is observed that there is an absence of studies that aims to explain how new practices emerge and become consolidated at the field level (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). The social practices must be understood as being a set of activities with meanings (Jarzabkowski, 2005) and that are shared among the social agents in a given social context, which enables the interactions among them. For understanding the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, this study adopted the theory of structuration.

### 3. Duality of Structure: social interaction

The dichotomy present in the social theory has its roots in various sociological approaches, presenting two dominant perspectives ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ (Parker, 2000). The former advocates that, when a social actor performs an action, it is determined by the institutional structure, whereas, in the latter, the social agent performs the action through freedom (Alexander, 1992). Giddens (1984) contrary to the existing dichotomy in social theories argued that, the social world must be understood in terms of recurrent social practices; here, subject and object are constitutive through the social practices.

Based on the *praxiological approach* has been developed the theory of structuration, aiming to reconstruct an unified social theory; in others terms, break the dichotomy between structure and agency (Garcia Selgas, 1994). Structure and agency are not independent phenomena, but rather represent a duality (Giddens, 1984).
The ‘duality of structure’ is the ‘structuration’ in which the conduct is recursively organised (O'Dwyer & Mattos, 2009), which shows the mutual dependence between structure and agency (Giddens, 1979).

Giddens (1984) considered the variables ‘time’ and ‘space’. The structure, i.e., structural properties, is not situated at the time and space; in fact, it is a virtual order of differences, being produced and reproduced through the 'social interactions'; the social system is situated at the time and space, being materialized in recurrent social practices, resulted of the dual relationship between structure and agency.

Thus, the structural properties are not separate from action, but they are involved in the production and reproduction (O'Dwyer & Mattos, 2009; Giddens, 1979; 1984), which are both the means and the results of the practices that form the social system. The social systems are composed of agents and structural properties and, they are related to the time and space (Giddens, 1984). Thus, the social system concept proposed by Giddens suspends the dualism between structure and agency (Whittington, 1992). The social systems, then, may be understood through a set of institutionalised characteristics, in which the activities are both defined and restricted by them (Giddens, 1984).

The structure properties are defined in terms of rules and resources (Giddens, 1984; Asenssi, 2005). The 'rules' in the theory of structuration cannot be confused with rules formulates, being expressed in laws and norms (Giddens, 1989). For Giddens (1989) the rules are formulas, being generalizable procedures, since the procedure makes possible the methodical execution, and the generalizable is applicability at any context. Thus, rules are assumed as generalizable techniques and procedures, and they are applied in the reproduction of the social practices (Giddens, 1984).

For Giddens (2000) the rules has two distinct characteristics and must be expressed conceptually, being typified as semantic and normative. In the former, the rules are related to the meanings, constituted by interpretative schemes and, in the latter, the rules are related to the sanctioning of the social conduct, i.e., norms. Giddens (1989) pointed out that the most important rules for social theory are those related to the reproduction of the practices.

The ‘resources’ are typified as allocative and authoritative, and they are responsible for social change. Authoritative resources are capabilities that generate command over people, and thus, encompass intangible resources. Allocative resources are capabilities over material objects, which generate power (Giddens, 1984); in other words, these resources are responsible in capacitating the action (Bryant & Jary, 2001).

The resources are the 'basis' or 'vehicle' of the 'power' that are mobilized by the actors in the social interaction (Giddens, 2000). 'Resources' are the main source of 'power'. For Giddens (1984) the power concept is defined in a relational perspective; in other words, the power is a dimension of the social interactions. However, the conceptual root of power for Giddens (1984) is grounded in the domain, since the agent has access and he manipulates for influencing the interaction with the other. Power, then, is tied to the transforming capacity, i.e., action, of social actors.

The ‘action’ corresponds to the capacity of social actors for mobilising the resources for achieving a goal; in other words, the individual’s ability to make a difference
In this perspective, the 'agency' can be understood as the capacity, i.e., power, of being the genesis of the actions. For Alexander (1992) the agency must be understood in terms of actions related to the cultural process; the action come from the agency is not the reproduction of the systems of internalized meanings, but the action must be seen as the production of the meanings systems.

Agency is a process that occurs through a continuous action of competent actors and reflexive (Giddens, 1993). Human agency is constituted by two consciousnesses, the discursive and the practical. The former refers to the knowledge that agents can express through verbalisation. 'Discursive consciousness' is based on the capacity of the social actors in rationalizing their actions (Giddens, 1989).

The latter is a set of tacit knowledge used in the social practices; in other words, 'practical consciousness' is based on the tacit knowledge that the social agent has and which enables the agent to know what he does and why he does; this consciousness is situated at the daily social activities and she is responsible by realisation them (Giddens, 1984). Practical consciousness is one of the most important aspects of theory of structuration, in which agents are recognized as reflexives (Bernstein, 1989).

The continuity of the social practices evidences the central role of the reflexivity, but reflexivity is only possible due to the continuity of the practices that become them recognized throughout space and time (Giddens, 1984). The competent agent of Anthony Giddens is capable of performing the social reproduction through their reflective monitoring ability. However, for institutional change, i.e., social production, the reflexivity should not be seen as a capacity that guarantees the continuity of the social practices, but rather as a source of change. Therefore, the next section is concerning 'reflective consciousness', which is discussed by Paul Ricouer.

4. Reflective Philosophy: critical consciousness

Ricouer's reflective philosophy (1950, 1960) is influenced by renowned authors, which each influencing a phase in their work over time. The theoretical cut of this study is based on the 'Philosophy of the Will', strongly influenced by Husserl. The work 'The Voluntary and the Involuntary' which constitutes the 'Philosophy of the Will' has been constructed from a phenomenological perspective, since the eidetic analysis enables to describe the human will and, consequently, the state of freedom.

Reflection and consciousness are not the same study phenomena. 'Reflection' is defined as a 'free act' which seeks to obtain a better understanding of the world and that constitutes the 'reflective consciousness' of the individual. Thus, on one hand, the consciousness enables the individual to understand the world of immediate way, on the other, the reflective consciousness enables the individual to learn as subject constituted of thought (Ricouer, 1950).

Reflective consciousness considers the relation between 'reflection' and 'freedom', since the reflection is seen as a free act. For this author, freedom is not defined either by the absence of determination and either by the presence of indeterminacy; in fact, this author evidenced the importance in identifying a type of determination significant for the freedom. Freedom, then, arises from an inner experience of determination (Ricouer, 1950).
For Ricouer (1950) the reflexive consciousness is responsible by the development of 'projects'; the projects are developed through a non-naive reading of the reality, being justified by the 'motives'. The motives are the essence of the conception on the will; Ricouer (1950) pointed out that for "[...] a motive, to determine is not to cause, but to legitimize, to justify." It is explicit that the motive is the wisdom for acting and he can not be seen as a cause responsible in producing the desired effects. From the motives concept, Ricouer (1950) solved the problem that a voluntary act is an indeterminate act; in fact, a voluntary act is an act determined by the motives developed by the individual.

Saying that a voluntary act is determined by the motives can not be regarded as a free act. However, defining the motives as being the reason for acting indicates that the motives is justifying the will of the individual (Ricouer, 1950). The 'determination of the will' is realized by the self-consciousness of the individual; in other words, the consciousness is responsible in developing the motives in accordance with their determinations (Ricouer, 1950).

The affectivity for Ricouer (1950) is related to the 'values'; thus, talking on the motives implies in considering the values. This author considered the existing values; although the 'value is not something given', but emerges from the 'act of valuing'. Valuation is understood essentially as an act of the reflective consciousness. The motives and values are not develop simultaneously, in fact, valuation is at the final phase of the development of the will; thus, first are developed the projects, after the justification of the motives and lastly the choices (Ricouer, 1950). The choices are made in detriment of the will of the individual.

Being free corresponds in deciding by itself the motives, being justified by the reason; the determination of the motives justified by the reason denotes an indetermination that is determined, highlighting 'attention' (Ricouer, 1950). Attention exerts the central role in the voluntary process, as Ricouer (1950) pointed out "[...] our acts depend on our judgments, but our judgments depend on our attention; we are masters of our acts because we are masters of our attention."

It is explicit that this author defines the attention concept in terms of ‘initiative', which is configured from a action that fosters a change. Thus, freedom is not seen more as an act of choice, but rather as the 'power of the choice'. Freedom must be understood in terms of power and act and that they are complementary. For Ricouer (1950) the 'power' is the mechanism that enables the crossing between the wanting and doing, i.e. action.

As mentioned above the human will emerges from an understanding made by the consciousness that develops the 'objectivity'. In the reflexive philosophy the objectivity is not related to the truth or reality (Ricouer, 1960). For this author, the 'objectification' enables to rescue the reflection on a respective objective; it is through reflection that occurs the junction between the 'consciousness that receives the things of the world', i.e., immediate reality, with the 'consciousness that seeks to identify and understanding the meaning of the things and of the world', i.e., reflective consciousness.

Receiving the things comes from the world emphasizes the 'finitude of man', since the world presents to the individual from a respective viewpoint; on the other hand, determining the meaning of things comes from the world indicates the 'infinity of man'.
'Finitude' is the starting point for the process of objectification. The individual begins his reflection from the recognition of his own finitude (Ricouer, 1960).

The human existence is the finitude, but also the overcoming of the finitude, through the 'act of saying'. The saying overcomes the immediate perception; thus, on the one hand, the individual perceives the object, on the other, the individual says on the object and there is the inclusion in this saying both of a particular perspective and perspectives that the individual does not has on the object. Infinity, then, is seen as the act of saying, being the overcoming of the finitude of the human existence. The saying is the 'power of meanings', each particular meanings can be seen as one perspective among others (Ricouer, 1960). The assumptions concerning the philosophy of the will possible to understand the underlying mechanisms that constitute the human reflexivity, as well as the relationship between reason and action.

6. Dynamics of the institutional processes

The theoretical background presented in this study shows, at first, a plethora of analytic approaches available within organisational neoinstitutionalism that signal, on the one hand, that is well developed, and, on the other, a dissension in understanding the institutional life. Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the approaches analysed.

Table 1 - Summary of the main characteristics of the theoretical approaches to organisational institutionalism

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<th>Theoretical approaches</th>
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<th>Time</th>
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<td>Neoinstitutionalism Original (DiMaggio and Powell)</td>
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<td>Institutional work (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca)</td>
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</table>

Source: Elaborated by the authors

As shown in Table 1, an aspect of similarity between neoinstitutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995; 2001) and the theoretical extension of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012) is the adoption of a 'macro-sociological perspective' for the explanation of the institutional life, since the studies in these approaches predominantly turn away from explanations based on agency. On the other hand, institutional entrepreneur and institutional work (Eisenstadt, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby &
Leca, 2009) aims to understand the institutional dynamics based on the 'micro-sociological perspective', emphasizing the role of the agency.

Therefore, there is a predominant dualism in the theoretical approaches of the organisational institutionalism, which is a legacy of the sociological theories. From the ‘determinist perspective’, i.e., macro-sociological, the action is defined by the institutions and the actors are mere epiphenomena of the social structures. However, from the ‘perspective of voluntarism’, i.e., micro-sociological, agency is able to establish the structure and the actors are transformed into social agents.

Among the analysis approaches presented in this study, the institutional work is promising, since aims to understand the institutional life through the social practices performed by the agents (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009). This movement is referred to as the ‘practice turn’, representing in a potential rupture in the established paradox in institutional theory, the dualism between action and structure. Adopting the theory of structuration for understanding the institutional process enables to withdraw dualism by the duality; here, structure and action are highly dependent (Giddens, 1989).

In the theory of structuration is explicit that the recurrent social practices, i.e., social routines, which represent a social systems, i.e., institutions, is result of the relationship between the agent's action and the structural properties (Giddens, 1989). This theory presents a dynamic perspective and the ontological security is dependent on the reflexive monitoring of the social agents that emanates from the rules embodied into social structure.

Social practices must be understood as being a set of activities constituted of meanings (Jarzabkowski, 2005) located at the time and space (Giddens, 1989), enabling the social interactions. Without the social practices the interactions cannot occurs; it is evident when Bakhtin (1929) defined language as a social practice, in which enables the interaction between social actors at the respective context.

Based on the reasoning in the previous paragraphs, the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, must be supported in the social interactions, emphasizing the social practices. Thus, the basis of the micro-foundations for understanding the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, is through the assumptions contemplated by the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1993) and reflexive philosophy (Ricouer, 1960). The reflective philosophy of Paul Ricouer provided insights for understanding the underlying mechanisms of the critical consciousness of the social agents, since the reflective monitoring contemplated by Giddens (1989) is based on recurrent social practices and the reflexive ability responsible by the work institutional (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009; 2011) is not evidenced the underlying mechanisms that constitute it.

Both the theory of structuration and the reflective philosophy enables to understand how the actor becomes a social agent through the characteristics that constitute it and, consequently, the indissociable relationship between action and structure, being represented by the expression NT - 1. The institutional process must be understood as a collective phenomenon carried out through the social interactions and represented by the expression NT, where N is the analytic level and T is time. At the same
time, the social system, i.e., institutions, is constituted by recurrent social practices in a respective contexto, represented by the expression NT + 1 – see Figure 1.

**Figure 1**– Micro-foundations of the conceptual model for institutional change

![Diagram](image)

**Source**: Elaborated by the authors

Figure 1 illustrates the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, through the social interactions, being materialized in social practices performed by the agents that constitute a respective institutional context.

The social practices arises from an indissociable relationship between the action of the social agents and the structure. For Giddens (1984) the actors are defined as competent agents, supported by the consciences that they have. The practical consciousness is important, enabling to the social agent to perform their activities in conformity with institutionalized standards, i.e., rules.

Conformity is discussed both macro-sociological perspective and micro-sociological. The former is identified in the studies of the organizational neoinstitutionalism; here, the organizations conform to the context in which they are inserted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995) through the ceremonial adoption (Popadiuk, Rivera & Bataglia, 2014).

The latter is found in the works of Berger and Luckmann (1998) when they pointed out that, human becomes a social actor as they internalise the meanings systems. These analysis approaches has in common is the legitimacy concept. Legitimacy is a symbolic value (Suchaman, 1995) that allows both the organisational perenniality and the
access to the respective social group, since the belonging to a respective group depends on the conformation with the social standards considered legitimate by the grouping.

For this reason, the practical consciousness is relevant and must be understood as being a tacit knowledge on a respective context; here, social actors are both individuals and organizations. Therefore, for understanding the practical consciousness is fundamentals to identify the social agents and their attributions, as well as the main activities performed by them.

The practical consciousness is responsible by the reflexive monitoring. The reflexivity in the theory of structuration assumes a central role, but this reflexivity is formed from the continuity of the practices that becomes them recognized throughout space and time (Giddens, 1984). In this perspective, the theoretical extension of institutional work considers that the practices responsible in influencing the social structure are resulted of a reflexive activity performed by the social actors (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009; 2011).

For these authors, the reflexivity of the social actor is a necessary condition for the recognition of institutionalised standards in social practices of the field. It is explicit that the reflexivity contemplated in the theory of structuration is based on the immediate consciousness, responsible in doing a simultaneous reading of reality, being referred to as a false consciousness, according to masters of suspicion, i.e., Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.

The reflexivity capable of creating new social practices should be based on a reflexive consciousness, being responsible in developing new ways of doing the things, i.e., projects (Ricouer, 1950); here, the projects are justified by the motives. Ricouer (1950) defines the motives as being the reason for acting. For this author the reason is based on the attention that is understood in terms of initiative, being defined as a action that fosters a change in the social reality. The reflexive consciousness and their underlying mechanisms are responsible both by interpretation and by acting in social reality.

The social agent is the one who capable of performing an action that potentiates an institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation. It is explicit that the social practices, i.e., a set of activities with meanings, are performed by social actors in the course of the social interactions. The institutional change emerge at the individual level; however, the establishment of the change occurs at the intra-organisational and interorganisational levels.

Berger and Luckmann (1998) pointed out that the institutional process is initiated in the externalisation of the thoughts through the act of saying. Ricouer (1960) emphasized that the act the saying surpasses the condition of finitude of the man; in other words, man receives the things of the world, i.e., finitude, and in the act of saying he transcends their own finitude.

Giddens (1989) pointed out the discursive consciousness that endow the social agent to say what he does and why he does. The discursive consciousness of Giddens (1989) it is based on a perspective of social practice, being understood as an action capable of changing the social reality. In other terms, the discourse, i.e., language, is not
a way of representation of the world, but rather an action on the world and on the other (Fairclough, 2000).

Discursive consciousness becomes central in the institutional process, since it is through the discursive consciousness that the social agent develops a discourse with values incubated, justifying the new social practices. In the change of a social practice, the divergence only materialises when it is identified and recognised among the actors in a given context as an anomaly; in other words, if the changes are not problematised, the existing practice will not be challenged (Lounsbury & Crumley, 1997).

The problematization occurs both at the intra-organisational and interorganisational level, fomenting the emergence of conflicts. Pruitt and Rubin (1986) pointed out that the conflict arises from a disagreement among the social actors; in other words, conflict arises from a clash of divergent interests among actors at the level of the social practices (Giddens, 1978). The conflict must be understood from an assertive perspective, it is fundamental for breaking the status quo, being an inherent characteristic of any social organization; it is a natural condition (Pondy, 1967) for any process of change. In fact, Ranson et al. (1980) evidenced that, the conflict is fundamental for the development of the institutions.

The conflicts of interest necessarily implies a time horizon for their resolution, since change denotes resistance. Resistance is an inherent characteristic of the human nature because humans tend to protect the status quo, guaranteeing their interests (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977; Hernandez & Caldas, 2001). In conformity with Barley and Tolbert (1997) when they pointed out that the institutionalisation occurs over time, since it is a complex process that aims to transform beliefs and actions into rules of social conduct.

Some authors have identified the following mechanisms to address resistance to change, namely: i) manipulation; and ii) coercion (Robbins et al, 2010). Both mechanisms are related to the power. Although it seems clear that consideration of the variable ‘power’ is essential in understanding the institutional process, it stands out that is neglected in the neoinstitutional approaches and their theoretical extensions which assume that institutionalisation occurs through social interaction and consensus.

However, in the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, the variable ‘power’ must be considered. For Giddens (2000) the power is a necessary condition in any social interaction, it is based on political resources and materials that the social agents have and use for capacitating the action.

In addition, the desired change will only be materialised through a collective action involving at the intra-organisational and interorganisational levels. Lewicki et al (2002) pointed out that the negotiation, i.e., collective action, is an inherent activity of the human relations; in fact, any object can be negotiated. Thus, collective negotiation has as central aim to construct a collective meanings system for the new social practices, since the social practices are patterns of activities constituted of meanings (Jarzabkowski, 2005).

Collective action involves several social actors who are co-participants of a negotiation process in relation to the divergent interests involved. Accordingly, the first
phase of the collective action occurs in the intra-organisational scope; here, it is necessary to establish the anomaly and the alternative solutions through negotiation internal to the organisation. The second phase of the collective action aims to bring the established change from the intra-organisational level to the interorganisational level, promoting changes in the institutional matrix of the field.

At the interorganisational level, the organisation needs to belong to the dominant coalition of the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Suchman, 1995 Seliznick, 1952, 1955), i.e., it must be legitimised in the social grouping, since the dominant coalition is responsible for the establishment and provision of political support for the institutional matrix. However, for belonging to the dominant coalition the organization must use the power, which it is based on the resources (Giddens, 2000) and in the legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Popadiuk, Rivera & Bataglia, 2014).

Popadiuk, Rivera and Bataglia (2014) indicated that, legitimate organisations ensure their place in the trade associations and their participation in negotiations about the establishment of new standards and rules. However, the interorganisational collective negotiation that constitutes this phase will occur in collective spaces, for example, in commercial associations. In this phase, it will be necessary to establish the anomaly and the potential solutions, now negotiated inter-organisationally, in order to direct the reconstruction of the collective meanings system (Fligstein, 2007; Fligstein & Mcadam, 2012; Lounsbury & Crumley, 1997). The use of political tactics in this phase was discussed by Fligstein (1997, 2001), Seo and Creed (2002) and Popadiuk, Rivera and Bataglia (2014), who highlighted the need for the mobilisation and development of coalitions for any process of institutional change. At this moment can be understood as the objectification phase of Berger and Luckmann (1998). When the consensus of the new social practices is reached, it is characterized by the internalisation phase (Berger & Luckmann, 1998).

The process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, is finalized at the legitimisation phase. In accordance with Berger and Luckmann (1998), legitimisation is the justification of the new rationality; here, the legitimacy should not only be considered as the transmission of values, but also as the transmission of the knowledge of new social practice (Berger & Luckmann, 1998). However, at this phase may encounter resistance from organisations that did not participate in the negotiations which established the new social practice; here, rules are seen as norms that have a coercive character, aiming to ensure the social conduct (Giddens, 2000).

**Implications and Concluding Remarks**

The central aim of this study was to understand the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, from the social interactions. In order to achieve this aim was adopted the micro-foundations approach through the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and reflexive philosophy (Ricouer, 1950; 1960), enabling to configure a dynamic perspective, being fundamental for understanding the change in institutions.

In the institutional studies was identified that the variable ‘time’ has been characterized in a range of different ways, being understood in historical and socio-cultural terms (Berger & Luckmann, 1998) or at a punctuated moment in the institutional life, i.e., the homogeneity phase (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) and combination phase.
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). Therefore, the first apparent contribution of this study refers to the configuration of the institutional process, which it is parameterized by phases that occur over time; in other terms, from the emergence of a new social practices to the establishment at the intra-organisational and interorganisational levels.

Both the macro perspective and micro present only a part of the institutional process; in other words, approaches of the organisational institutionalism each focus on one specific part of the process of institutionalisation. Organisational neoinstitutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) focuses on explaining the homogeneity of forms, but does not explain how heterogeneity emerges. The institutional logics aims to explain institutional change (Kodeih & Greenwoods, 2013) through the combination of attributes of existing logics, but do not elucidate how new logics emerge. Entrepreneur (Eisenstadt, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988) and institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby & Lea, 2009; 2011) describe the actions that are responsible for impacting the institutions, but do not explain how new social practices emerge (Scott, 2001; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). There is a problem of ecological fallacy, since it is observed different levels in the analysis approaches in organizational neoinstitutionalism. Thus, the second contribution is related to the comprehension of the institutional process in an integral way that considers from the emergence, i.e., micro level, to the establishment of new social practices, i.e. macro level; the interrelation between levels represents a theoretical contribution.

We observed that the organizational neoinstitutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) and the theoretical extension of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012) there is an emphasis that organizations are immersed in their environments; in other terms, the institutional environment is responsible by defining the organizational actions. Institutional force can also be seen in the work of Berger and Luckmann (1998), where the social actor's belonging to a respective group is dependent on their conformity, i.e., internalization, with the environment in which they are inserted. In these analysis approaches the variable power is understood in functional terms that aims to maintain the social order, coming from the social system.

Concomitantly, it is noted that the institutional process occurs in a consensual way in the social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1991), institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991) and institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio, 1988). There is an absence of studies which considers the conflict in the institutional process. It is a mistaken view, since any break in the status quo encourages the emergence of divergent interests. It is explicit that the variable power has been neglected in the analysis approaches of the organizational neoinstitutionalism; in fact, has been treated in a traditional perspective; in other terms, is seen in structural terms.

Considering the assumptions of the theory of structuration for understanding the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, enables to bring the variable power for the institutional analyses. The power is a variable that must be considered in studies related to the social phenomena. For Giddens (1989) the power is presents in any social relation and must be understood as a dimension of the social interactions.

The power assumes the central role in institutional process, enabling to capacitate the action of the social agent; in other words, without the power there is no the agency
This transformative capacity on the world is mediated by the use of available resources in the structure of the social system. In the duality of structure the power is seen from a praxiological perspective, suspending the existing dualism between the structural power and agentic power. Power in the giddensian vision, i.e., structurationist, is a constituent element of the social practices.

Finally, the last contribution of this study refers to the established paradox, the dualism between action and structure. Understanding the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation, based on the assumptions of the theory of structuration enables to establish the dual relationship between action and structure in the process of institutional change, i.e., re-institutionalisation; here, the duality is seen in the constitution of the social agent, where the structure both defined and restricted the action.

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