I. Introduction

There is a dilemma in institutional economics: how to explain the relative influence and interaction of structure and agency. There is a large literature across multiple disciplines which addresses this question (see for example Hodgson 1998; Hodgson 2003; Hodgson 2015, 54-62, 67-75, 168-170). The objective of this paper is to offer a theory of endogenous institutional change which accounts for both structure and agency, using the case study of gender and the family. The core structural aspect of this consideration is the self-ownership model of labor and the dependent family (or “male breadwinner” family), as an essential attribute of capitalist economies. The so-called “culture wars” in contemporary US is an example of the evolution of a normative structural role for gender, by means of political process as an example of agency.

II. Structure vs. Agency

Nothing seems more personal or spontaneous than sexual preference and sexual expression. Yet there is a body of literature that suggests that sexual identity and behavior has a normative, coercive component (Butler 1990, 1993; Foucault 1978; Hewitson 2003, 2013). Such an approach may be called the “production of subjectivity,” compared with structural approaches which rely on such concepts as patriarchy (Folbre 2009; Persky 2016, 112-118), sexual division of labor (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), or kinship (Cox 2007). Building on an analysis and critique of Levi-Strauss’ notion of the “exchange of women,” the difference between “sex” as a set of biological characteristics and “gender,” as norms of behavior, suggests that meanings of gender are cultural rather than “natural” (Rubin 1975). If gender is cultural, or “socially constructed,” there is a possibility of change, critique and resistance.

There are many definitions of structure. One approach based on language is found in Davis (2015a, 2017a), stressing key tropes like a) property, b) related institutions, such as the legal system, and c) expertise, such as economics and law. Hodgson (2003) stresses the importance of “habit,” while mainstream economics stresses calculation of self-interest and utility maximization by the rational individual. Structure is related to institutions, defined as “a system of human-made, nonphysical elements – norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules- exogenous to each individual whose behavior it influences [and] that generates behavioral regularities” (Greif and Laitin 2004, 635).
In this paper, the tentative definition of structure is the set of social arrangements that are functional to maintain a specific set of institutions. An example of a specific set of institutions is the system of capitalism (Appleby 2010; Ingham 2008).

While structuralism is no longer a common approach in economics, compared with methodological individualism, one wonders to the extent that gender binaries are functional for the existing economic system. Further, drawing upon Lacan and others, there is the question of the intelligibility of certain positions, given the structure of language (Butler 1997, 2000).

Arguments made by advocates of “caring labor” (Folbre 2009; Fraser 2016) suggest that women provide a service of human reproduction which is essential to the system. This service of human reproduction is provided at lower or no cost to firms and to the economy as a whole. If women did not identify as “feminine,” with altruistic motives of care, this service would be much more expensive, reducing profit. As women have increasing employment options outside the home, there is a presumed “crisis” of caring labor, which will make these services much more expensive. Others see the declaration of “crisis” itself as an indicator of ideological mobilization, to reinforce gender norms such as “family values” (Cooper 2017).

If the “individual” of economic theory requires free or low cost nurturance and socialization (Schonpflug and Klapeer 2017, 208), then the status of the autonomous mobile individual becomes an issue. That is, there is a theory of personality, or subject formation, which is also at stake (Butler 1987, 1993, 1997). The notion of the “individual” may be constructed, rather than natural or inherent.

In addition to “caring labor,” gender norms are important for fertility and transmission of property to the next generation. Property functions as an incentive to behavior, both work and family. The stability and “permanence” of social institutions requires such regular behavior, at the workplace, at the site of consumption and reproduction, and the legal framework for marriage and inheritance.

There has been a critique of compulsory heteronormativity, and resistance to these norms as a mode of freedom. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage constitutes a partial resolution to such resistance, while also creating backlash.

The following discussion will explore whether there is a structural component to issues of gender, property, and kinship. That is, are there certain norms which are functional to capitalism? Second, if norms of the gender binary are structural, then the breech of these norms may be one source of the current “backlash.” Competing political parties may reach out to such disaffection to constitute alliances, such as the “neoconservatives” in the 1980s (Steinfels 1979). And “backlash” for some constituencies may constitute “agency” for others.

Functionalism is not a sufficient definition of structure, nonetheless, since there can be competing paths, at any given period. That is, alternatives exist, such as a “high road” of a caring, high-tax, human-capital intensive economy (Lister 2009), but such options are less necessary with automation, outsourcing, and “global care chains” (Fraser 2016), and unlikely in the face of the obstinate counter-arguments and counter movements. On the other hand, the neoliberal Social Structure of Accumulation (Kotz 2015; Harvey 2005), supported by a Religious Right/Republic Party alliance seems to be continuing with such opportunistic political alliances in support of the “low road” of austerity and reductions in public commitments to human reproduction. Political movements can determine which alternative
gains most support, building agency into the choice of alternatives related to structure, at a given historical moment.

III. Structuralism and Symbolic Position of Women

Feminist anthropologists have recovered the analysis of the exchange of women by Levi-Strauss and the incest taboo (Butler 1990, 38-43; Butler 1993, 72; Rubin 1975) as a basic structural feature of society. Following Lacan and Orlando Patterson, Butler retrieves the concept of “social death” (Butler 2000, 54-55, 71-80) to refer to persons who cannot attain full status as human subjects due to the violation of conventional norms. Butler points out that women’s “position” in the family is defined by kinship, while also noting the ambiguity of Antigone as the representative of that position (Butler 2000).

Women’s reproductive capacity is conceptually acquired by men, with “autogenesis or self-constitution” (Butler 1993, 36-49) as an implicit assumption. The feminine is excluded from the conceptual framework of “the economy.” Any considerations of fertility or rates of reproduction are assigned to a different discipline, demography. Considerations of personality or sexual preference are assigned to psychology, and the formation of social norms to sociology.

Kinship is necessary for the state but remains outside the state. For example, the family is a separate institution, and women are viewed as threat to the state for Hegel. The mother’s unique relationship with her son contradicts the requirement for his patriotic service to war and defense of state (Butler 2000, 10-12, 35-37). The production of sons for soldiers risks death to both mother and son, resistance to which may implicitly challenge the normative commitment of self-sacrifice for citizens. On the other hand, the son’s courage may be due, in some part, to the intensity of his connection with his mother.

Can the structure of kinship be radically reformulated without revulsion or backlash? The widespread and rapid acceptance of same sex marriage, transgender persons, and “queer” politics suggests the affirmative, as does the concept of “post-familial” communities (Hopkins 2017, 97-102).

Legalization of same sex marriage in some states may convey social acceptance, but is still the source of rage and backlash in other states. The continuing debate on gendered bathrooms is one indication.

IV. Women and Property

Property has been a trope within liberal political theory, and women have had a special role in the conception of property. Historically, women have been considered the property of their husbands, without capacity for their individual ownership of property, in ancient Greece and in early modern Europe (Gordon 1996).

By their ability to bear children, women have also been considered the conduits for property transmission to the next generation (Davidoff and Hall 2002), as well as the provision of heirs for hereditary monarchies (Adams 2005).

Women have been important in providing partners and sons for family businesses, constituting networks of kin (Trivellato 2009; Padgett 2012b; Pak 2013).

With the development liberal forms of the state largely replacing hereditary monarchies, and with the emergence of separate impersonal financial institutions (Lamoreaux 1994), family-based business have become less important (with the important contemporary exceptions for the Koch and Trump families).
The role of the family has become relatively invisible in the corporation and the liberal state (Greif and Tabellini 2017), while remaining the source of “caring labor” and human reproduction (not valued in GDP or economic categories).

Kinship is the invisible link in the ostensibly insuperable divide between public and private spheres (Butler 2000, 81-82).

V. Self-Ownership of Labor Model (or Commodity Labor Power)

For some structural theorists, the self-ownership of labor is an inherent aspect of capitalism (or the commodity labor power) (see discussion in Hodgson 2015, 245-250, 252-256, 259-261). Both Marx (1967) and Polanyi (1944, 72-73) see labor as a “fictitious” commodity, which is treated as an object for sale according to the laws and institutions of capitalism. Wage labor is compared with slave labor, in terms of relative efficiencies (Weber 1978, Vol. I, 161-164).

The self-ownership of labor model emphasizes the “responsibility” of the worker and his family for their own support (Davis 2017a, 185-187) with little aid from the employer or the limited state (Cooper 2017). Individualism is a form of discipline for the worker (Davis 2015b). Heterosexual “feminine” women perform “caring labor” with no compensation, as part of their altruistic “identity.” Reproduction of the labor force is less costly in this model, and so is functional for the capitalist economy (Fraser 2016).

“Ownership” is the reward to the household head, including ownership of one’s own labor, one’s own children, one’s own house, and incentives to protect and to enhance all of these “objects” of value. Widespread distribution of property, such as suburban homes, financial assets, and cash, can help increase political support for the protection of property (Lamoreaux 2011), and lead to a distinctive type of politics (Davis 2015a, 49-54).

Ownership of property and legitimate claims to returns to property is foundation for the entire system, in terms of incentives and rationale of income distribution.

Yet self-ownership implies a split self, and hierarchical relationship with non-owners and non-humans (Schonpflug and Klapeer 2017, 205-208).

VI. The Individual

The autonomous abstract “individual” is the center of the analysis of economics and political theory, if not also Western Civilization (Scott 1996), in spite of widespread critique (Milonakis and Fine 2009; Davis 2011; Hodgson 2013). The abstract individual with specific characteristics, such as “self-interest,” facilitated “liberal governmentality” (Poovey 1998, 2008).

To admit relationship instead of autonomy requires awareness of dependency. The denial of this dependency results in a split subject (Butler 1997), with a fragile ego subject to rage.

A. Representation and Suffrage

With the development of the modern economy, population had a new significance, including labor as the source of value, and families as the source of consumer demand, socialization, and human
reproduction. This instrumental use of human beings, one set by the other, was legitimated by the development of “natural” distinctions among them. Managing the population had new importance for the practices of governance. “Political arithmetic” was developed to improve analysis of the population, to assign relevant categories, and to provide objective statistics (Poovey 1998, 2008). The quantification of characteristics of the population helped to provide empirical evidence, which further supported the existence of novel institutions, like the state and the market. These “reifying abstractions” became real, with real effects, with the support of numbers (Poovey 2002) and the presumption of objective science.

Given the paradox of sovereignty, the entire population is represented as a whole, as a single “body politic” (Warner 1992, 387). The method of representation is by each individual citizen who qualifies for suffrage (by age and historically by race, gender and property ownership). The individual person is represented in Congress in the US, aggregated differently by state (Senate) and by population (House), with popular election for the President weighed differently in the electoral college. In spite of checks and balances, the individual citizen is formally represented in government (Davis 2015a), however limited or effective that “voice.” The aggregate of citizens as a single “body” conveys “sovereignty” and legitimacy to the state. Because of constitutional protections of property in the US, the citizen is separated from control of the economy (Polanyi 1944, 225-226), nonetheless. Because of loosening of campaign finance laws and increasing use of the media in elections, there is inequality of access to public voice (Winkler 2017; Mayer 2016).

B. Gender

According to economic theory and “liberal governmentality” (Poovey 1998, 2008), that abstract individual is assumed to be rational and “self-interested.” The category of women is the exception, considered as a trope or symbol of connection and recognition, emotional and physical. That is, the norms of woman as gendered provides the exception for the abstract individual, who is rational, “separate,” and autonomous (England 1993).

The demand for women’s rights based on individual autonomy becomes “paradoxical” (Scott 1996; Davis 2017a) in this context, and can create “backlash,” based on religious norms, personal identities, and economic interests (Fraser 2016). That is, women are making claims for equality, while also defending their difference as a group based on biological characteristics.

Efforts to overcome the “paradox” include the ideological “work of gender” in nineteenth century Britain, with the “angel in the house” (Poovey 1995), the “maternalism” of the early twentieth century women’s movement in the US (Koven and Michel 1993), and “caring labor” in the twenty-first. That is, there is a type of individual, unique by nature, who prefers to dedicate herself to the care of others, an altruism which is distinctly different from the assumptions of self-interest for everyone else (Folbre 1994). Such an individual can be like all others, following her preferences and personal choices, even if those personal choices are radically different.

For others, norms of this type constitute a “production of subjectivity” (Hewitson 2003), according to the organizational requirements of a given society.

Because of the pervasive presence of land, labor, and capital markets, there are certain structural constraints. The “individual” in a modern liberal state is “mobile,” without attachment to a given land parcel, given employment, or community. Identification of the individual is by name (kinship), place of
birth, and citizenship in a territorial nation (if any). Negative rights of property are more often protected than positive rights to minimum standards of living (Searle 2010, 184-198). In the modern liberal state, the individual is represented in a public sphere, which is divided from the private sphere of employment and the private sphere of the family. As Searle notes (2010, 170-173), democracy works best when important issues are not the subject of a vote. In my view, important issues seldom arise for a vote, since property rights are constitutionally protected and income redistribution is often considered taboo in mainstream political economic theory and practice.

C. The Corporation

The corporation is the other paradoxical “individual” which encompasses production, labor markets, capital markets, and product markets, all in one “fictitious” entity (Polanyi 1944, 130). The corporation is a collective, yet treated as an individual in law, as a single entity (Davis 2015a). Ownership of this form of individual private property is the origin of economic surplus (Davis 2017c).

VII. Recognition and Structure of Personality

Based on a society composed on “individuals,” recognition from other individuals is essential for one’s sense of self (Taylor 1989). That is, without family or “community,” there are only “arms-length” impersonal contract and market relations. Recognition is a term which designates one’s mutual and simultaneous awareness of others (Wolff 1968), although without commitment or attachment.

A. Struggle, Discipline, Competition

Rather than recognition vs. redistribution, individualism is embedded in the functioning of the economy (Cooper 2017, 23), in norms, ideology, and legitimation.

There are various models for recognition in political theory, with a large literature.

- Hegel’s master/slave dialectic (Butler 1987, 43-59; Butler 1997, 31-62; Fraser 2013, 159-186)
- Discipline of heterosexuality (Butler 1997, 132-150); ambivalence and melancholy of the split self (Butler 1997, 167-198)
- “Consumer” choice as foundation of the “individual” (Davis 2015b)
- Owner as foundation for the individual (Mirowski 2013, 107-115; Butler 1997, 31-40)

B. Alternatives

The existing models of recognition are oppositional in nature, where struggle and competition are the means by which individuals recognize each other (Fraser 2013). It is possible, nonetheless, instead of division of labor and struggle, to postulate shared cooperative labor, intersubjectivity, and interdependency (Crossley 1996; Benjamin 1988). Changes in the gender distribution of household child care and labor may in turn alter personality and socialization (Hewitson 2013).

C. Importance of Sexuality in Emulation, Desire, and Connection

With the assumption that personal emotional relationships are located in the family, the abstract individual is without significant connection to other individuals. There is a literature which formulates the forces of connection, nonetheless,
• Emulation (Mishra 2017)
• Sociality (Hont 2005, 2015)
• Desire (Foucault 1978; Butler 1987)
• Caring labor (Folbre 2009),

all of which are forms of connection/reaction/recognition among “individuals.”

VIII. Double Movement and Structural Logic

The question remains regarding the structural nature of gender binaries and normative heterosexual preferences. Are these norms in some way “structural,” the violation of which can lead to “backlash”? Such a suggestion would only be possible if gender is socially constructed, rather than “natural,” solely influenced by instinct.

A. Double Movement

One example of reaction or backlash is the Polanyian “double movement” (Polanyi 1944; Blyth 2002; Block and Somers 2014). New forms of social solidarity are asserted in reaction to the myth of the self-regulating market and disciplinary individualism. According to Polanyi, in the 1930s, the two non-market reactions consisted of Communism and Fascism.

Do the norms of sexual behavior and gender identity provide a similar backlash in the early 21st century? Is such a backlash the result of active political support by factions?

The alliance of religious right and Republican Party has been growing with active engagement of women. In fact, the “subsequent polarization of American politics” can be largely explained by the choice of the two major parties to support different sides of the women’s movement in the 1970s (Spruill 2017, 2).

Does this alliance have a structural logic? That is, free market laissez faire leaves the reproduction of the labor force to the private sphere. The “natural” motives of human reproduction and the religious meaning assigned to sexuality mean that these aspects of the commodity labor power, or self-employment model, can be based on family “responsibility” (Cooper 2017) without relying on government. Further, religion provides an alternative form of community and identity, non-economic and non-material, based on “higher values.” The political mobilization of the religious right and the Republican Party was actively anti-New Deal, supporting laissez faire and anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism (Phillips Fein 2009).

B. Varieties of Capitalism

Generally speaking the literature on “varieties of capitalism” does not address issues of gender and the family. Recent discussions of the welfare state partly address that omission (Evertsson et.al. 2009; Mandel and Shalev 2009). With respect to the family and child care, one could identify various models (Cooper 2017; Bergmann 1986).

In contrast to the self-ownership of labor model, there are two modifications within some versions of the welfare state: de-commodification and de-familialization (Evertsson et.al 2009, 214-215). De-commodification would reduce the pressure for wage labor by public payments for unemployment, disability, and retirement. De-familialization would increase public support for maternity leave, child
care, and child support, enabling women to have other options than marriage. That is, these models of public support would reduce the discipline of the self-ownership of labor model, by providing alternative sources of income besides wage labor and patriarchal family forms. Although there are variations of the degree of enforcement of the self-ownership of labor model, it remains the norm for capitalist countries, nonetheless.

C. Glass Ceilings, Time Binds, and Plateaus

Is there a “natural rate” of female labor force participation (Goldin 2006, 14-18), given the structural constraints discussed above? In data analyzed by Goldin, the rate of increase has been slowing lately, and perhaps has reached a plateau. Structural constraints such as the “time bind” suggest that there are limits (Boushey 2016).

IX. Theories of the Backlash

There are many theories of “backlash,” perhaps most classic being the analysis of class struggle by Marx and Engels. Others include

a) Theories of status decline (Edsall 2017a and b)
b) Changing role of business, including business political activism (Kotz 2017; Phillips Fein 2009; Mayer 2016; Phillips Fein and Zelizer 2012)
c) Personality conflicts, splits (Butler 1997)
d) Theories of revolution (Tilly and Tarrow 2015)
e) Double movement (Polanyi 1944)
f) Christian conservatism; populism (Fitzgerald 2017; Judis 2016; Lind 1995)
g) Backlash against radicalism (New Deal, 1960s; 2008) (Dochuk 2012; Norton 2004; Mirowski 2013, 129-138)
h) Nietzsche’s Ressentiment; (Mishra 2017; Norton 2004; Mirowski 2013)

X. Agency: Women’s Movements

The so-called “second wave” of feminism unleashed an exploration of women’s history (see for example Lerner 1986, 1993), which has contributed to the deepening of the understanding of the varieties of expression of women’s agency.

Although it is not possible to summarize this large literature in this brief conference paper, roughly speaking the first wave of women’s movement in the late eighteenth century was based on individual rights and manifested the paradoxical nature of the individual (Scott 1996; Davis 2017a). That is, women as a distinctive group where claiming equal rights as individuals, like any other individual.

Second wave of the Women’s Movement emphasized equality, individual rights, and possible alternative gender identities (Butler 1990). This contrasted with “maternalism” of the early 20th century movement (Koven and Michel 1993), which based their claim to citizenship upon their experience as mothers.

Since the 1980s, there has been an active pro-life/family values women’s movement (Spruill 2017; Cooper 2017), in opposition to the equal rights/gender identity focus. That is, in opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, a women’s movement which supported “family values” and religious definitions of women’s role began in the 1970s.
In spite of the success of the women’s march in January 21, 2017, there may be limits of the progressive women’s movement, due to the following:

1) The “individual” is still paradoxical, for women as well as men
2) Sexuality is still circumscribed by religious institutions in the private sphere, with “confessional” power (Foucault 1978).
3) Women’s increasing Labor Force Participation Rate and relative pay still leave women in secondary and pink labor market (Goldin 1990; Blau and Kahn 2013), dependent on the “family wage.”
4) Self-employment model leaves working class families without adequate support (Cherlin 2014), in US vs. welfare states in Europe (Edin and Nelson 2013), especially with property rights rhetoric, austerity, and limited government.
5) Opportunities may be limited by sexism and discrimination against racial and religious minorities and immigrants
6) Property rights rhetoric precludes progressive taxation to support public goods
7) Women’s equal pay and equal employment, same-sex marriage and transgender rights are recognized as part of liberal equal rights, while still controversial

The intensity of political polarization has continued to increase, as revealed by the new tactics of the 2016 Presidential campaign. Beginning in the 1980s, the alliance of the religious social conservatives plus economic conservatives included all of the above limits to the progressive women’s movement, in addition to so-called “fake news”, the increasing role of social media, and marketing tactics of the Trump campaign and Presidency. The renewed appeal to “white” as an identity category has threatened to displace the priority of race and gender in making claims to benefits from the state.

XI. Structure: Paradoxical Capitalism

It is possible that, instead of feminism being “paradoxical” (Scott 1996), the structure of capitalism is. The financial circuits of the economy consist of commodity production, consumption, and taxes, enforced by the state (Polanyi 1944, 63-67, 139). The exclusion of human reproduction (Folbre 2008) and ecology (Moore 2015) is the characteristic of the institutional structure, not some error or oversight. The self-ownership of labor model requires that the individual worker and his family take “responsibility” for the care of his family, financed out of his own wage. There is an economic value to his labor at a capitalist workplace, where labor is formally a commodity, but there is no value to performing the requirements of human reproduction in the home (Davis 2017a). The principles of equal rights and fair competition apply to the abstract “individual,” explicitly ignoring gender, race, and nation of origin. The corporation is a legitimate collective, protected by the state, but the labor union is subject to “anti-combination laws” (Polanyi 1944, 81, 123, 224, 280). Global capital flows are protected and enforced by consistent international agreements, while international labor laws are highly unequal and are routinely violated.

Women are the exception to the assumption of rational self-interest of the individual, who is normatively an “owner” of his own labor power or other assets. The “free” individual is unencumbered by association with, or commitments to, other individuals, in families, workplaces, or communities. The critique of this a-social individual has often been written, but is attributed to flaws in social science, rather than the paradoxical structure of the economy, itself. Social science cannot grasp the integrated
nature of the public/private divide because of the institutional and disciplinary division between economics and politics, market and society (Polanyi 1944, 71; Phillips-Fein and Zelizer 2012).

The “paradoxical” structure of capitalism helps to explain “intersectionality,” as well. While the abstract individual is non-differentiated, there are specific functions within capitalism which are performed by identifiable groups, denoted by specific categories (Acker 1992). One example is Jews and money-lending, while there is a Christian prohibition against usury. While performing a necessary role, the Jew is nonetheless identified with the function, which is abhorred. The hatred for the role is projected onto the group, as systemic anti-Semitism.

For women, there is a similar process. Caring labor is necessary for the reproduction of the labor force, yet is not valued under a system of self-ownership of labor. This function is merely assumed as the mission of the unique role of women, presumably “natural.” This role is projected onto all women, who then bear the respect but also the stigma of performing a role of no value. “Dependency” is a structural feature in the self-ownership model, but is subject to denigration, nonetheless (Fraser 2013, 83-110).

Another example is labor. The performance of work is essential for commodity production, yet arguably the worker does not receive the full value of his product, a requirement for the production of surplus. While labor is essential, its “undervaluation” can lead to stigma and projection of inferiority. While the identity of “working class” can be positive, it is also subject to flight, where the preference is for “middle class.”

For immigrants as well as former slaves and colonial populations, the subordinate role is projected onto “natural” characteristics of these races, which then are rendered inferior and deserving of this lower status. Homosexuals are also condemned as an abomination in traditional patriarchal religions, and so subject of unequal treatment in countries which honor those religious traditions.

These identities can become positive for these specific populations, resisting the negative stereotypes, and claiming “equal” treatment. At the same time, these identity categories also bear the signs of taboo, subordination, and “natural” inferiority. This can be called a form of “demonizing the victim” (Mirowski 2013, 124), and helps to explain the “categorical” nature of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991), and the persistence of discrimination in spite of norms of equality.

The capitalist system is a system of markets which exchange “fictional commodities,” according to Marx (1967) and Polanyi (1944), and so these identities and functions are performed in a coordinated matter, although subject to instability. The social construction of gender may operate differently under capitalism, compared with other economic systems, by linguistic categories and identity instead of physical coercion and separation (a position in contrast with “dual systems” theory; see for example Young 1981).

These distinct categories, which are assigned specific functions, provide an insight into endogenous institutional change. That is, categories become identities, which are both the source of identity and resistance. The categories are paradoxical, indicating core functions, while also reflecting the ambivalence of devaluation and dehumanization.
The corporation, an economic entity which operates on bureaucratic principles, manages the categorical channeling of labeled individuals in various markets. Corporations, while fewer in number than small firms, control the majority of assets and employment, as well as large market share in key industries, occupying the “commanding heights” of the economy. Further, the contingent criteria for welfare programs also reinforce the importance of the particular identity categories, by marital status, for example (Cooper 2017).

Recent authors stress the role of language in human civilization (North, Wallis, Weingast 2009; Taylor 2016; Searle 2010). Rather than generally true of all human history, it is possible that the role of language, and the specific functional identity categories, are particular to capitalism. These categories and the associated empirical documentation help to create the “reality” of the associated institutions, like the state and the market, in spite of their existence only as socially constructed. The role of language may be heightened in the validation of “fictional commodities.”

XII. Agency: Backlash against Disciplinary Individualism

Rather than a form of freedom, individualization is a form of discipline and isolation, resulting in disempowerment.

A. Money and Individualism

Rather than market/non-market dichotomy, according to Polanyi’s analysis, the notion of disciplinary individualism is the way in which money as a mediator of social relationships serves to individualize and fragment social relationships (Davis 2017c). That is, the nature and quality of social relationships, personality, and identity change when there is an extensive labor and product market, rather than a dichotomy of market/non-market. Money is a widely distributed form of property which can buttress individual identity, and while maintaining mobility and flux of financial circuits.

Money is another form of representation of the whole population and economy. Money is an abstract reflection of the individual, both quantitative and qualitative, to all other individuals, a mirror between individual and social.

Resistance to disciplinary individualism could be broad-based, including race, class, gender. Demands could include more unconditional public goods provided by the state, or new forms of the state (Davis 2017b). Resistance could include critique of the corporate form as the method of disciplining and maintaining the individual, as well as individual labor market competition and individualized, contingent public services like health and unemployment benefits.

B. Political Opportunism

The normal discontent with respect to the disciplinary structures of capitalism creates potential for new alliances and coalitions. It is possible that the pro-market conservatives saw such an opportunity with the pro-life women’s movement. By stressing women’s family orientation and altruistic service to children, this identity is reinforced. Organizational funds and media support can enhance the appeal of this identity, based on the pre-existing Christian Evangelical church. The two women’s movements which first diverged in the 1970s can then provide the foundation for a new political polarization, which has been increasingly strident since the 1980s.
Table 1. Implications for Women’s Equality in the Labor Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of the state; taxes</th>
<th>A. Equality for Women (Liberal Individualism)</th>
<th>B. Family Values (Patriarchal Religions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women’s High LFPR/Higher Education</td>
<td>Women’s Low LFPR/Less education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the state;</td>
<td>High services/ high taxes</td>
<td>Low services/low taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td>Support of public goods such as child care,</td>
<td>Women’s identity in the home, with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elder care, and family leave</td>
<td>altruistic service to family and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Multiplier</td>
<td>Low wage service work; global care chain</td>
<td>Volunteers, philanthropists, political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Corporation</td>
<td>Maternity leave; sexual harassment policy;</td>
<td>Promotion of family values in products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equal pay; promotion of women to CEO, boards</td>
<td>and ads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of directors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 1. above, both orientations for women have long-standing respectable rationales and rhetorical positions. In terms of property orientation, more educated women have valuable human capital to alienate for a wage. They can qualify as self-owners. Less educated women would tend to aspire to the male breadwinner model, where responsibility for home and children rests on the male head of household, or what Cooper calls a “Fordist” family (Cooper 2017).

There are additional contrasts between these two models. Column A resonates with equal rights for women, drawing from Mary Wollstonecraft (Davis 2017a). Column B is consistent with the Evangelical movement which has a long history in the US (Fitzgerald 2017). In terms of the role of the state, Column A would require greater state involvement, in terms of both taxes and public goods, and consequently is more consistent with the Democratic Party platform. Column B would be consistent with a smaller role for the state, in terms of lower taxes and fewer public goods, and so is more consistent with the traditional Republican Party platform.

Women with higher levels of education (Column A in Figure 1.) are more likely to be employed in high wage occupations (Goldin 2014), and to be able to afford private child care outside the home. In the US, with lower levels of public and private support for women’s employment (Evertsson 2009), the class and education divide by gender is more extreme (Blau and Kahn 2013).

To the extent that the state supports women’s increasing labor force participation, there is an implicit “de-familialization.” That is, women can become increasingly independent economically, outside of marriage. Trends in divorce and rising age of marriage, as well as declining fertility, have implications for the operation of the entire economic system.
There are various implications. Women’s increasing labor force participation also tends to increase their wealth and bargaining power within the household (Agarwal 1994). On the other hand, some describe a “post-familial” future (Hopkins 2017).

XIII. Endogenous Institutional Change

Institutionalists have long aspired to explain institutional change, not just social structure. For example, Greif and Tabillini (2017) stress how exogenous individual preferences lead to differential choices of residence, which then further reinforce those original individual preferences.

Hodgson stresses how socioeconomic systems “create and recreate individuals”... In addition, “learning can reconstitute the individual” (Hodgson 2003, 162; italics in original). Further, “institutions not only depend upon the activities of individuals, but also constrain and mould them” (Hodgson 2003, 163). That is, institutions exert pressure on individuals for normative behavior. On the other hand, norms and socialization are never perfect, and so there are innovations and disciplinary breakdowns which can lead to institutional change over time.

Such deviance or resistance can be organized or random, and leaders of key institutions can exert influence on which variations are selected. There is a path-dependence of institutional change, in which those with ideological and material resources have a greater influence on subsequent alliances and rhetoric.

Property is long-standing term of reference in political theory and political economy (Davis 2015a). Defense of property in the Constitution, in Enlightenment thinking, and in suffrage rules tend to privilege property holders in the public sphere. While property owners are privileged in institutional rules, those categories of persons who are themselves property reflect the internalized stigma of personal objectification.

To the extent that institutional position is complemented by family alliances by class, a property-owning elite becomes more secure. The inequality of income distribution further contributes to the imbalance of voices in formation of public discourse. Preferential inheritance laws and access to educational institutions would further compound the reinforcement of inequality.

The size and well-being of the so-called “middle class” has been a political as well as an economic indicator. A large middle class, defined by substantial property ownership and relative economic independence, has represented stability and continuity in political preferences (Lamoreaux 2011). The downward mobility since 2008 (Edsall 2017a and 2017b), as well as the continuing increase in inequality, may represent a tipping point in the US political stability (see the large literature on inequality, such as Boushey, DeLong, Steinbaum 2017).

The extent to which women have a history of being treated as property, as well as their reproductive functions in the self-ownership of labor model, help to define roles that are available to them in the current economic system. These roles can be challenged, nonetheless, and even changed, by political movements in particular periods.

XIV. Conclusion

It is possible to integrate agency and structure, taking a long term institutional perspective (or “long duree”). Certain agents are privileged by structure, and then reinforce or change that structure by their
efforts, competing with other alliances. This so-called “structure” must be enacted by significant numbers of individuals, lending energy and commitment to distinctive identities, norms, and behavioral patterns. The existing historical structure is important in privileging certain agents and issues (“path dependency”), but the impact still relies upon human agency to enact or to change these structures.

A theory of backlash based on gender relies upon the social construction of gender, which renders these identity categories flexible, rather than “natural” or immutable. While the discipline of gender has relied upon restriction of access to education, personal mobility, control of sexuality, sumptuary laws, marital practices, custody, and inheritance laws, and religious ritual in other periods and cultures, capitalist discipline may be uniquely dependent on language categories and identities, in order to reproduce and manage “fictional commodities”. These identities and categories can be the source of stability, as well as resistance.

Gender is a salient example of the method of historical institutionalism (Davis 2015a, 2017a), which focuses on a key term, such as gender, analyses the expertise involved, such as economics, biology, and religion, and the associated institutions, such as the family and the public-private divide.

Women’s agency has appeared throughout history, including various “waves” of the women’s movements. Were the two competing women’s movements in the 1970s spontaneous or sponsored, or were there elements of both? Does this affect the extent to which these political movements can be considered an example of authentic “agency”?

Is there a “tipping point” for “de-familialization,” in terms of gender identity, population growth, sex ratios, and dependency ratios? The demand for housing, along with durable consumer goods, for example, depends on the rate of household formation. In a consumer-based economy, fertility and population growth are surprisingly important but often neglected variables.

Further, does capitalism depend on free or low-cost care? Is there a “crisis” of care as more women choose labor force participation? Are these functional requirements of capitalism sufficient to explain the salience of gender norms and identity categories? Is the structural requirement of unpaid labor in the home sufficient to resist the organizational impact of the various women’s movements?

Would goals of women’s advancement be more successful and less paradoxical if not related to claims of individual equality (Davis 2017a)? Would there be less of an opening for “family values” to challenge their self-interested individualism, with less political polarization? Rather than individual women’s equality, should the goal be new forms of community (Davis 2017b)?

The key point is to explore the structure of existing institutions without gender blinders, to gain full perspective and understanding of the dynamics related to political and social movements, as well as economic forces, in each period. This exploration of gender further elucidates our understanding of long term historical change, including the interaction of structure and agency.
Bibliography


