

HETERARCHY

Philip G. Cerny, ed.

Prepared for the Routledge series **Innovations in International Affairs**

Table of Contents

Section I: Theory and History

Chapter 1: Heterarchy: Toward Paradigm Shift in World Politics

Philip G. Cerny

Chapter 2: From Postinternationalism to Heterarchy: Turbulence and Distance Proximities in a World of Globalization and Fragmentation

Dana-Marie Ramjit

Chapter 3: Heterarchy and Social Theory

Carole L. Crumley

Chapter 4: New Medievalism (Re)Appraised: Framing Heterarchy in World Politics

Aleksandra Spalińska

Chapter 5: From Empire to Heterarchy

Gita Subrahmanyam

Chapter 6: Heterarchy and State Transformation

Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri

Chapter 7: Political Power in a Heterarchical World: A Categorization of Extra-state Authorities

Rosalba Belmonte

Chapter 8: Globalization, Heterarchy, and the Persistence of Anomie

Alexandre Bohas and Michael J. Morley

Section II: Issue Areas and Case Studies

Chapter 9: Nationalism, Capitalism and Heterarchy: Continuity and Change in the 21st Century World Order

Peter Rutland

Chapter 10: Heterarchy and the Limits of Global Governance

Philip G. Cerny

Chapter 11: Metropolitan Diplomacy: Global Metropolitan Law and Global Cities Seen from the Heterarchy Perspective

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU

Chapter 12: Heterarchy in an Age of Intangibles and Financialization

Philip G. Cerny

Chapter 13: WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis as a Case Study of Heterarchy

Judit Fabian

Chapter 14: Heterarchy and Global Environmental Change

Gabriela Kütting

Chapter 15: Heterarchy and Global Internet Governance: The Case of ICANN

Hortense Jongen

Chapter 16: Heterarchy in the Mexican Competition Network: The case of COFECE and IFC

Alejandra Salas Porras

Chapter 17: Heterarchy in Russia: Paradoxes of Power

Richard Sakwa

(Chapter authors' affiliations and specialisations to be added)

Chapter 1

Heterarchy: Toward Paradigm Shift in World Politics

Philip G. Cerny

Introduction: Beyond State-Centrism

International Relations theory has been dominated since the study of IR formally began at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919 by the presumption that world politics is at its core a system of states. However, this way of conceiving world politics was always problematic, challengeable, time-bound and increasingly anachronistic. In the 21st century world politics is becoming increasingly *multi-nodal* and characterised by *heterarchy*—the predominance of cross-cutting sectoral mini- and meso-hierarchies above, below and cutting across states. These heterarchical institutions and processes are characterized by increasing autonomy and special interest capture. States today are no longer primarily “proactive states” but more and more “reactive states”. State capacity is not simply eroded but entangled in hybrid structures and processes. A fundamental paradigm shift is required in our understanding of how world politics works.

There have in recent decades been three mainstream “competing paradigms” in the study of “international” relations—realism, liberalism and constructivism (Wolin 2016). All assume that the dominant independent variables are states and the inter-state system—i.e., methodological state-centrism. Indeed, even contemporary analytical/theoretical frameworks focused on the complexity and coupling of networks assume that states are still the basic “nodes” of the system (cf. Guillén 2015). Since the mid-20th century, however, a dialectic of globalization and fragmentation (Cerny and Prichard 2018) has caught states and the interstate system in a complex evolutionary process toward what is called “heterarchy”—the coexistence and conflict between differently structured micro- and meso- quasi-hierarchies that compete and overlap not only across borders but also across economic-financial sectors and social groupings. This process empowers strategically situated agents—especially agents with substantial autonomous resources, especially economic resources—in multinodal “competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions”. The core of this process is the triangulation of (a) the “disaggregated state” (Slaughter 2004), where policymaking

processes and bureaucratic institutions are embedded in distinct issue-areas and sectors rather than centripetal state structures, (b) fragmented global governance and “regime complexes” (Alter and Raustiala 2018), and (c) the shift of the world economy to the Third (or Fourth) Industrial Revolution, sometimes called “functional differentiation”. This process is leading to an uneven spectrum of market/hierarchy or public/private *de facto* policymaking processes and diverse types of “capture” between a range of private actors and meso- and micro-hierarchies, institutions and processes. State structures and state actors have less and less “state capacity” to act as “unit actors” in world politics. Multilevel and multi-nodal policymaking and implementation processes are evolving above, below and cutting across states caught up in the dialectic of globalization and fragmentation.

1. State-centrism in International Relations Theory

State-centrism has a complex history. On the one hand it has been seen to evolve from the political unification of specific territories by ruling cliques and/or mass movements through a consolidation of internal power structures and the role of both civil and external warfare in transforming multilevel, tribal or feudal structures into institutionalised sovereign entities, mainly since the 18th and 19th centuries but increasingly consolidated in the 20th, especially after the Treaties of Versailles and Sevres after the end of the First World War. Complex, shifting frontiers—empires and tribes—were replaced by more clearly demarcated borders (Schain 2019). The ideological rationale for state consolidation has been to identify states sociologically with specific, identifiable social units called “nations”, that Benedict Anderson (1983) defines as “imagined political communities”. The concept of “nation” in the pre-modern world was more localised and tribal (Leon 1973); in the modern age it would come to be seen as an ethnically consolidated grouping providing bottom-up legitimacy to emerging nation-states.

However, it can be argued that economic factors came to be the most significant variable in the consolidation of nation-states. The First Industrial Revolution enabled political and economic elites in England to transform what became the United Kingdom into the first economic superpower, both in terms of domestic consolidation and the expansion of British economic power in the world. This led other proto-states to consolidate in competition with other emerging states on both levels, especially in Europe, where the nation-state system developed and spread its organizational model internationally through innovation, trade and empire (Kennedy 1988; see Subrahmanyam, this book). More important

historically, however, was the Second Industrial Revolution, in which the combination of the consolidation of nation-states and the large factory system in a range of cutting-edge industries such as steel, railways, energy production and distribution, shipbuilding, later automobiles—a structure that would come to be called “Fordism”—led to new, more intense forms of international competition. It also was at the core of Stalinism. These developments, both market-based and monopolistic/oligopolistic, gave rise to state-economic complexes and, indeed, to social and institutional reorganization along the interacting lines of capitalist hierarchies and Weberian bureaucratization. The interstate economic conflict/competition that resulted played a leading role in two World Wars and later to the Cold War. The state and the interstate system therefore came to be seen as the apogee of a secular process of ordering political systems, starting from hunter-gatherer societies and evolving through city-states and empires to statist modernity.

In this context, the development of International Relations as an academic discipline has been dominated by state-centric paradigms (cf. Jackson and Sørensen 2010; Wolin 2016, Daddow 2017). This approach is referred to as “two-level games” (Putnam 1988). The most state-centric paradigms have been so-called “realism” and its later spinoff, “neorealism” (Waltz 1979). Neorealism is rooted in the methodological assertion that states are inherently constructed domestically in a hierarchical mode, i.e. that they are analytically distinct endogenously sovereign and bureaucratically ordered units. In contrast, the “international” system is “anarchical” in that there is no overarching hierarchical order. States operate as “unit actors” and must compete and/or cooperate *as if* they were internally organised as effective hierarchies, leading to a preordained hierarchy-within-anarchy set of games. The other two “mainstream” paradigms, liberalism and constructivism, also posit the structural predominance of states and the inter-state system. Other non-mainstream paradigms such as Marxism, World Systems Theory, Critical Theory, Feminism, Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Green International Theory (Daddow 2017) deal with important subcategories, rather than the macrostructure of world politics. The state, therefore, whether or not it was effectively *centralized*, has nevertheless been seen as *centripetal* in the evolution of socio-political life (Birnbau 1982). In fact, however, the role of imperial heterarchical structures was also a crucial part of this process (Subrahmanyam, this book). This flawed conceptualization of the state has, of course, been dominated not only by quasi-imperial state-building processes themselves, but also by the perception among mass publics that states, despite their disadvantages, are *normatively* the best way to organise

political life. Furthermore, state-building has long been associated at least since the Enlightenment with notions of progress and modernity, whether liberal, capitalist or socialist.

2. Beyond state-centrism: the dialectic of globalization and fragmentation

However, the dialectic of globalization and fragmentation is increasingly undermining the “segmentary” differentiation of state/interstate-centrism and are superseding it with “functional” and/or “sectoral” differentiation (Albert *et al.* 2013) above, below, and cutting across states. Furthermore, globalization itself is all too often perceived to be a structurally homogenizing process, requiring new forms of intergovernmental cooperation or global governance. Dimensions of homogenization are said to include economic globalization, the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism (Cerny 2020), socio-cultural convergence, technological innovation and change, liberal internationalism and global governance, and the emergence of a so-called “flat world” (Friedman 2005). Normative calls for a quasi-world state follow this logic, called “global governance” (see Cerny, this book). However, supposed global-level developments are increasingly challenged by structural tensions and contradictions across multiple dimensions. Theorists have identified these processes using concepts like “functional differentiation,” “multiscalarity” (Scholte 2000), “deterritorialization”, disparate “landscapes” (Root 2013), “neomedievalism” (Spalinska, this book), “fragmegration” (Rosenau 1990), “state transformation” (Hameiri and Jones, this book), or a “pluralist world order” (Macdonald and Macdonald 2020; see Belmonte, this book). Diverse differentiated structures become more co-dependent and complementary—more “functional”—in a post-modern world.

Among the dimensions of functional differentiation, economic activities and roles tend to underlie wider social and political processes of structuration (Albert *et al.* 2013). Social bonds too are increasingly fractionated and multicultural, often localised, regionalised and, indeed, dispersed through material and immaterial transborder linkages, especially information and communications technology, social media, migration and diasporas, and religious and ethnic, rather than “national”, identities. The best-known form of functional differentiation is economic, including multinational firms, financial markets and institutions, as well as a growing transnational division of labour among linked production processes or “supply chains” or “value chains.” The integration and differentiation of these structures makes them prone to

systemic shocks, as witnessed in the 2008 financial crisis. Related to this turn from the state is “deterritorialization”, in many cases more analogous to fluid, pre-modern “frontiers” (De Wilde *et al.* 2019). Indeed, the state itself is being transformed into a heterarchical structure (Hameiri and Jones, this book; Sakwa, this book). Today it seems more and more apposite to talk of the complex interaction not only of “competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions”, but also the interaction of localities, regions and different social and economic groups (see Antonescu, this book). Recent scholarship has suggested that up to 80% of the world’s population lives in areas of limited, failed or contested statehood (Geldenhuis 2009, Risse 2011).

One way to conceptualise these processes is what James N. Rosenau called “fragementation” (Rosenau 1990; see Ramjit, this book). This is an ongoing *process*. The European Union, for example, is in continual structural quasi-crisis, trying to deal centrally with plural tensions between the local and the transnational, as demonstrated by the Brexit issue and the setting up of a Eurozone bailout fund at the end of November 2020, which also involved difficult compromises between the E.U. and the “illiberal democracies” of Hungary and Poland on various social and taxation issues. In the United States and in the rest of the developed and developing worlds, economic growth may well be slowing down as the Third Industrial Revolution runs out of steam (Gordon 2016, Stiglitz 2019), while inequality increases (Piketty 2017, Milanovic 2016). Furthermore, austerity and the erosion of the rights of labour are undermining the mid- 20th century social contract on which the welfare state and liberal democracy have been based (Blyth 2013). Political leaders in unstable states are either engaged in attempting to restore authoritarian repression, as in Russia, China, Egypt and Turkey, or are ensnared in the breakdown of the political system, as in Brazil, Venezuela and a range of African countries. The number of what are called “failed states” is increasing, and the plurality of ways in which they are doing so is cause for alarm. Today disenchantment with the providential rhetoric of the Enlightenment is the norm. Rationalities of marginal economic utility have transformed statehood into a marketizing, *commodifying* process. The neoliberal state in particular sees people themselves as personalised *enterprises* in permanent competition with each other (Davidson and Rees-Mogg 1997; Dardot and Laval 2014, Cerny 2020), rather than the social animals of other versions of political thought. Furthermore, the state has become a promoter of financialization rather than welfare or social democracy, prompting the financialization of society itself—undermining the potential for what has been called the

“entrepreneurial state” concerned with providing public goods (Tiberghien 2007, Block and Keller 2011, Herman 2012, Mazzucato 2013). Nevertheless, state remains the primary provider of welfare programs, and finance cannot do without it for a host of public goods that rely on finance for credit. Social democracy has been replaced by the supposed “democratization of finance” and “financial inclusion” (see Litan and Rauch 1998, Shiller 2003). The state itself has in turn become a globalizing agent—a “competition state,” promoting its own disaggregation (Cerny 1997, Genschel and Seelkopf 2015).

3. Dimensions of Heterarchy: From the Sub-national to the Transnational

World politics is now better understood as a complex set of meso- and mini-hierarchies, including individuals and social groups, classes and vested interests, tribes and religions, and economic structures and processes that cut across state and regional boundaries, mediated at different speeds by different technologies, social bonds, identities and, in different forms, of marketization and oligopolization/monopolization. All this produces territories without governments, authorities without states, shifting boundaries, regulatory systems transcending borders, and increasingly powerful but sectorally splintered supranational authorities (Cassese 2016). From this perspective, “levels” are an oversimplification. So, for example, while semi-dematerialised price mechanisms by which markets and institutions relate to each other and to the wider economy, society and polity, shape our interactions, they do so through people and material processes that connect them (Coole and Frost 2010, Srnicek 2013). They take place through our interactions with the computers, logistics, and groups of people “next” to us in an increasingly “intangible” world of “capitalism without capital” (Haskel and Westlake 2018). Actors and political processes can only increasingly *react* to price changes that are independently produced by market and institutional transactions, many of which are automated. Strategically situated actors are able to mobilise and manage material resources, influential contacts, ideologies and mind sets, and knowledge.

This has led to the consolidation of a range of “extra-state authorities” (Belmonte, this book) and “regime complexes” (Alter and Raustiala 2018) across a range of institutions and processes including “low capacity states”, fragmented global governance, and oligopolistic, sectorally differentiated quasi-corporatist policymaking, regulatory and policy implementation processes. These embed the “privileged position of business” (Lindblom 1977) and transnationally powerful interest groups, including intangible

sectors such as information technology (with firms such as Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Netflix and Google, referred to as FAAANGs), banking and finance, etc., as well as transnational corporations, supply chains and other linkages transcending and undermining state territorial and economic boundaries. States themselves have sought to benefit from these structural transformations by sponsoring the international competitiveness of domestically located firms, leading to transnational oligopolization and rent-seeking. Recent history suggests that the development of an effective global governance structure as a way to reorganise world politics is increasingly unlikely, even moving in the opposite direction. In other words, the processes of capture and reverse capture explored by Dauvergne and Lebaron (2014) in the case of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have, if anything, proliferated more widely in the transnational sphere precisely because of the fragmented institutionalization and crosscutting linkages and networks characteristic of that sphere. Davies, in a seminal history of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), argues that the burgeoning constellation of such organizations in the 1980s and 1990s has been declining and fragmenting in the 21st century (Davies 2014). Global governance can be even more vulnerable to whipsawing, bypassing, capture and manipulation, even corruption, than the traditional domestic public policy sphere.

At the core of these processes, furthermore, is the *hybridization* of the public and private. Key actors—the more powerful economic interest groups, state actors in particular issue areas, certain NGOs, etc.—have differing and sometimes incompatible interests as well as common interests and engage in processes of conflict, competition and coalition-building in order to pursue those interests. Actors depend upon the capacities of real-world, crosscutting “interest” groups—including both “sectional” (or “material interest”) and “value” groups (Key 1953), civil society groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements—to manipulate constraints, to identify and take advantage of opportunities, and to shape new directions. What is new, however, are the rapidly evolving transnational linkages among groups in a growing range of overlapping transnational webs of power. The most influential actors are those who can coordinate their activities across borders, at multiple levels and linking multiple nodes of power. *Governance* itself is therefore being transformed into a “polycentric” or “multinucleated” global political system.

The multinationalization of industry, the expansion of trade and the globalization of financial markets,

along with the development of a transnational consumer society, have transformed many sectoral groups into transnational interest groups, operating across borders and involved in complex competition and coalition-building with each other, with state actors, with so-called “global governance” regimes, and increasingly with mass publics. Within and across states, too, bureaucrats, politicians and other officials or state actors have become more and more imbricated with groups of their counterparts in other countries through transgovernmental networks, policy communities and the like. In the economic sphere, post-Fordist forms of production based on flexibilization have transformed “techniques of industry”, labour markets, finance and the like (Haskel and Westlake 2018, Frey 2019).

4. Capture and Networking

Key sets of groups that have in the past been closely bound up with the territorial nation-state are increasingly experimenting with new forms of quasi-private regulation of their activities. And state actors themselves, once said to be “captured” by large, well-organised domestic constituencies, are increasingly captured instead by transnationally-linked sectors. These actors do not merely set state agencies and international regimes against each other—a process sometimes called “venue shopping” (or “forum shopping”) or “regulatory arbitrage”—but they also cause them to try to network in an increasingly dense fashion with their peers in other states and simultaneously instill them and their transnational private/public links in state elites too. Among the major losers are trade unions and other groups with few transnational linkages, although they are sometimes still in a position to obtain compensatory sidepayments from national governments.

Major social movements and cause groups are increasingly focused on transnational issues, such as the environment, human rights, women’s issues, the international banning of landmines, opposition to holding political prisoners, promoting “sustainable development”, eliminating poor countries’ international debts and the like (see Rutland, this book). Operating in such a changing world is leading to new problems of management and control or “the privatization of governance” (Lake 1999; Kahler and Lake 2003) or the emergence of “private authority” in international affairs. Private actors decide more independently the rules of their conduct and act to ensure order in the markets, facilitate trade and protect private property (Claire *et al.* 1999, Ronit and Schneider 2000, Hall and Biersteker 2003, Stringham 2015). In this world, even small firms that seem ostensibly “local” are not immune, being dependent upon “foreign” raw materials, export

markets, investment finance, migrant labour and the like, and both increasingly form nodes of wider networks and coordinate their actions.

Less formal networks and more formal interaction among firms, “private regimes”, “alliance capitalism” and the ability of non-state actors in general to develop a range of formal and informal interconnections have led to significant degrees of “policy transfer” both across states and in terms of shaping the evolution of global governance more broadly (Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000; Evans 2005). Significant issue-areas, including accountancy, auditing, corporate governance, regulation of the internet (Jongen, this book), etc., have witnessed ongoing negotiation processes among firms, private sector organizations representing particular industrial, financial and commercial sectors, as well as governments and international regimes, in order to reconcile conflicting standards and move toward a more level playingfield (Mügge 2006). Those actors that will be most effective at influencing and shaping politics and policy outcomes are those who: perceive and define their goals, interests and values in international, transnational and translocal contexts; build cross-border networks, coalitions and power bases among a range of potential allies and adversaries; and are able to coordinate and organise their strategic action on a range of international, transnational and translocal scales in such a way as to pursue transnational policy agendas and institutional *bricolage*, although recent examples of the growth of populism and the persistence of anomie (Bohas and Morley, this book) demonstrate the strength of resistance. Meanwhile, recent attempts to reform financial regulation, for example, are increasingly facing obstacles stemming from the lack of a coherent transnational response (Goldbach 2015; Cerny, this book).

Major international meetings like the G20 or the COP26 climate change conference not only demonstrate differences among states; they are immediately faced with domestic pressures, making the transnationalization of policy something that often has to be pursued surreptitiously and legitimated indirectly—or “depoliticised”—especially when the light of crisis or disruptive change is shone on particular domestic sectors and interests (Roberts 2010). Those new actors—what Belmonte calls “extra-state authorities”—increasingly compete with the state’s ability to establish rules, control borders, formulate and implement public policies autonomously, and go beyond states’ boundaries and create their own sovereign system—i.e., self-government authorities, illegal authorities, civil society authorities and economic-financial authorities. At one end we find so-called “natural monopolies” and, of course, oligopolies, especially where

they are transnationally linked, characterized by “specific assets” (Williamson 1975 and 1985) that are basically indivisible, like the big factory system, aircraft manufacturing, Fordism, etc.; and, at the other end, those characterised by structurally competitive, divisible and inherently tradable “non-specific assets”. In the 21st century, however, there has been rapid and far-reaching *technological* change which is profoundly transforming both domestic and transnational economic structures and processes from small businesses to global finance. In particular, there is an ongoing debate about whether these changes lead to a growing tendency for the abstract financial economy to become divorced from the “real” economy of production, what has been called “capitalism without capital” (Haskel and Westlake 2018; see Cerny, this book), creating new groups of social and economic “winners” and “losers”. Three kinds of structuring dimensions, taken together, differentiate these issue-areas and distinguish the forms of governance most likely to develop in each of a range of “policy domains”.

5. Dimensions of Heterarchy

The first is a mainly *economic-structural dimension*. Where a particular industry or activity is characterised predominantly by specific assets, then government intervention, whether through public ownership, direct control, subsidization and/or traditional “hands-on” forms of regulation, is more likely to lead to relatively efficient outcomes compared with pure privatization or marketization. In contrast, where an industry or activity is characterised predominantly by non-specific assets—say a flexible, post-Fordist steel mini-mill, a small business that does not attract takeovers by large, especially transnationally organised firms, some high tech companies, service industries, etc.—then not only will it be more efficiently organised through private markets, but also, in public policy terms, arms’-length regulation. The second dimension concerns the configuration of interests characteristic of the industry or activity concerned. On the one hand, patterns of cross-border sectional or economic-utilitarian politics of specific agricultural sectors will be very different from those of a rapidly changing steel industry, varied high tech sectors, textiles and other consumer goods, or the commercial aircraft industry. On the other hand, new forms of value politics on a range of globalizing non-economic issue areas like AIDS prevention, poverty reduction, criminal law and the like, have been growing, where transnational pressure groups, advocacy coalitions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seek new ways to compete and cooperate. The third dimension concerns the relative sensitivity and vulnerability of the industry or activity to specific transnational economic trends—in particular export

potential, import vulnerability, position in an international production chain, exposure to internationally mobile capital and the like. When an industry or activity is insulated from such cross-border structures and processes, then lobbying pressure and “iron triangles” in that sector are likely to favour traditional redistributive/protective policy measures. However, firms and sectors that are highly integrated or linked into such structures and processes, especially where there is a “world market price” for a good or asset that determines local prices, then lobbying pressure from firms in that sector and from industry organizations is likely to be organised through flexible coalitions that include transnational actors from outside the national “container” and which operate at transnational level to influence global governance processes.

These dimensions might potentially be applied to assess the likelihood and shape of policy innovation and coalition-building across a range of contrasting, differently structured issue areas and policy domains, and the actors that populate them, including:

- financial systems and regulation,
- international monetary policy and exchange rate management,
- macroeconomic—fiscal and monetary—policy,
- microeconomic and strategic industrial policy,
- public and social services,
- trade policy,
- corporate governance,
- labour markets,
- welfare states, and
- the most informal, diffuse and unorganized – but nonetheless increasingly market-ized – Issue area of all, consumption.

It is ultimately the *mix* of policy measures that is the core *problématique* of the fragile transnational political process and heterarchical coalition-building. The politics of certain key issue areas like financial regulation can play a distinct catalytic role in reshaping global economics and politics *as a whole*, imposing their particular market and policy structure on other sectors and issue areas too.

6. 21st Century scenarios

There are several complex—and interactive—potential outcomes to these developments. The first is

“durable disorder” (Minc 1993), in which actors are continually attempting to experiment with pragmatic reactions to manage these developments through such processes as bringing economic sectors and activities into the public sector, as with responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. The second involves complex, uneven issue-areas—triangulated assemblages of vested interests, hubs, brokerage, “sectoral corporatism,” etc., in differentiated sectors; this is probably the closest to heterarchy. The third leads to anomie, possibly even *dystopia*, leading to a fundamental destabilization of world politics. The most likely outcome will be an uneven and unstable mixture of these scenarios—muddling through. Heterarchy therefore is still in an early stage of development. But given the dialectic of globalization and fragmentation, it appears to be the way the world is being restructured. The late 20th and early 21st centuries would appear to be a critical—secular—*branching point* in the path dependency of world politics and political economy, with a more uneven and unstable form of transnational capitalism unfolding that will increasingly be dominated by complex special interests. This restructuration process requires a new paradigm—heterarchy.

References

- Albert, M., Buzan, B., and Zürn, M., eds. 2013. *Bringing sociology to international relations: world politics as differentiation theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alter, K.J. and Raustiala, K., 2018. 'The Rise of International Regime Complexity'. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 14 (1), 18.2–18.21. 27 June.
- Anderson, B., 1983. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Birnbaum, P., 1982. *La logique de l'État*. Paris: Fayard.
- Blyth, M., 2013. *Austerity: the history of a dangerous idea*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassese, S., 2016. *Territori e potere*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Cerny, P.G., 1990. *The changing architecture of politics: structure, agency and the future of the State*. London: Sage.
- Cerny, P.G., 1997. "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization". *Government and Opposition*, 32 (no. 2), 251–274. Spring.
- Cerny, P.G., 1998. Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: globalisation as durable disorder. *Civil Wars*, 1 (no. 1), 36–64. Spring.
- Cerny, P.G., 2009. "Multi-Nodal Politics: globalisation is What Actors Make of It". *Review of International Studies*, 35 (no. 2), 421–449. April
- Cerny, P.G., 2010. *Rethinking world politics: a Theory of Transnational Neopluralism*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cerny, P.G. and Prichard, A., 2018. The New Anarchy: globalisation and Fragmentation in 21st century world politics, special issue on anarchy and International relations theory. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 13 (no. 3), 378–394. October
- Coole, D.H. and Frost, S., 2010. *New materialisms. Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press).
- Daddow, O., 2017. *International relations theory*. 3rd edition. London: Sage.
- Dardot, P. and Laval, C., 2014. *La nouvelle raison du monde* (Paris: la Découverte/Poche); English language edition *The New Way of the World: On neoliberal society*. London: Verso. (2013).
- Dauvergne, P. and Lebaron, G., 2014. *Protest Inc.: the corporatization of activism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Davidson, J.D. and Rees-Mogg, W., 1997. *The Sovereign Individual: mastering the transformation to the information age*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Davies, T., 2014. *NGOs: a new history of transnational civil society*. London: C. Hurst.
- De Wilde, P., et al., ed., 2019. *The struggle over borders: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Durkheim, É., 1893/1933. *The division of labor in society*, trans. George Simpson. New York: Free Press.
- Evans, M.G., 2005. *Policy transfer in global perspective*. London: Ashgate.
- Frey, C.B., 2019. *The technology trap: capital, labor and power in the age of automation*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Friedman, T.L., 2005. *The world is flat: a brief history of the 21st century*. 1st edition. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Geldenhuis, D., 2009. *Contested states in world politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gemzik-Salwach, A. and Opolski, K., eds. 2017. *Financialization and the economy*. London and New York: Routledge.

- Genschel, P. and Seelkopf, L., 2015. "The Competition State". In: S. Leibfried, et al., ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State*, pp. 1–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Goldbach, R., 2015. *Global governance and regulatory failure: the political economy of banking*. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gordon, R.J., 2016. *The rise and fall of American growth: the U.S. standard of living since the Civil War*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Guillén, M.F., 2015. *The Architecture of collapse: the global system in the 21st century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haas, P. ed. 1997. *Knowledge, power, and international policy coordination*, special issue of international organization. Vol. 46no. 1, Winter. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press
- Hall, R.B. and Biersteker, T.J., eds. 2003. *The emergence of private authority in global governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A., 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Haskel, J. and Westlake, S., 2018. *Capitalism without capital: the rise of the intangible economy*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Herman, A., 2012. *Freedom's Forge: how American Business Produced Victory in World War II*. New York: Random House.
- Higgott, Underhill and Bieler., 2000. *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System*. London: Routledge
- Holloway, J., 2002. *Change the world without taking power: the meaning of revolution today*. London: Pluto Press.
- Jackson, P.T. and Nexon, D.H., 1999. Relations Before States: substance, process and the study of world politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3 (no. 5), 291–332.
- Jackson, R. and Sørensen, G., 2010 . Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches. 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Kahler, M. and Lake, D.A., eds. 2003. *Governance in a Global Economy: political Authority in Transition*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Kanter, R.M., 1985. *The Change Masters: innovation and Entrepreneurship in the American Corporation*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.
- Kennedy, P., 1988. *The rise and fall of the great powers*. New York: Random House.
- Key, V.O., Jr., 1953. *Politics, parties, and pressure groups*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Lake, D.A., 1999. "Global Governance: a Relational Contracting Approach". In: A. Prakash and J.A. Hart, eds. *Globalization and Governance*. London: Routledge, 31–53.
- Leon, T.C., 1973. *Nationalism in the middle ages*. Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing.
- Lindblom, C.E., 1977. *Politics and markets: the world's political-economic systems*. New York: Basic Books.
- Litan, R.E. and Rauch, J., 1998. *American finance for the 21st century*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Macdonald, T. and Macdonald, K., 2020. "Towards a 'Pluralist' World Order: creative Agency and legitimacy in global institutions". *European Journal of International Relations*, 26 (no. 2), 518–544.
- Mazzuccato, M., 2013. *The entrepreneurial State: debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths*. New York: Anthem Press.
- Milanovic, B., 2016. *Global Inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press for Harvard University Press.

- Minc, A., 1993. *Le nouveau Moyen Âge*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Mügge, D., 2006. Private-Public Puzzles: inter-firm competition and transnational private regulation. *New Political Economy*, 11 (no. 2), 177–200. June
- Piketty, T. 2017. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Putnam, R.D., 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: the logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42 (no. 3), 427–460. Summer
- Risse, T., 2011. Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: introduction and Overview,” in Risse. *In: Governance Without a State?: policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp.1–38.
- Roberts, A., 2010. *The Logic of Discipline: global Capitalism and the Architecture of Government*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. London: Routledge
- Ronit, K. and Schneider, V., eds. 2000. *Private Organisations in Global Politics*. London and New York, Routledge
- Root, H.L., 2013. *Dynamics Among Nations: the Evolution of Legitimacy and Development in Modern States*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Rosenau, J.N. (1990). “The Governance of Frangmentation: Neither a World Republic nor a Global Interstate System”, paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Quebec City, 1–5 August
- Schain, M.A., 2019. *The Border: policy and Politics in Europe and the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scholte, J.A., 2000. *Globalization: a critical introduction*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shiller, R.J., 2003. *The new financial order: risk in the 21st century* . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Slaughter, A.-M., 2004. *A New World Order*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Srnicek, N., 2013. Representing complexity: the material construction of world politics. *International Relations*. In: *Unpublished PhD Thesis*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2019). *People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism in an Age of Discontent*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Stringham, E.P., 2015. *Private governance: creating order in economic and social life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tiberghien, Y., 2007. *Entrepreneurial States: reforming Corporate Governance in France*. In: *Japan, and Korea* .Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K., 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.
- Williamson, O.E., 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies*. New York: Free Press.
- Williamson, O.E., 1985. *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*. New York: Free Press.
- Wolin, S., 2016. (1966/2016). *Politics and Vision: continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* . Princeton expanded edition: N.J.: Princeton University Press.